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COMPLEXITY, INNOVATION, AND THE
REGULATION OF MODERN
FINANCIAL MARKETS
DAN AWREY*
The intellectual origins of the global financial crisis (GFC) can be traced
back to blind spots emanating from within conventional financial theory. These
blind spots are distorted reflections of the perfect market assumptions underpin-
ning the canonical theories of financial economics: modern portfolio theory, the
Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevancy principle, the capital asset
pricing model and, perhaps most importantly, the efficient market hypothesis. In
the decades leading up to the GFC, these assumptions were transformed from
empirically (con)testable propositions into the central articles of faith of the
ideology of modern finance: the foundations of a widely held belief in the self-
correcting nature of markets and their consequent optimality as mechanisms fr
the allocation of society's resources. This ideology, in turn, exerted a projound
influence on how we regulate financial markets and institutions.
The GFC has exposed the folly of this market fundamentalism as a driver of
public policy. It has also exposed conventional financial theory as fundamentally
incomplete. Perhaps most glaringly, conventional financial theory failed to ade-
quately account for the complexity of modern financial markets and the nature
and pace of financial innovation. Utilizing three case studies drawn from the
world of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives-securitization, synthetic ex-
change-traded fnds and collateral swaps-the objective of this paper is thus to
start us down the path toward a more robust understanding ofcomplexity, finan-
cial innovation, and the regulatory challenges flowing from the interaction of
these powerful market dynamics. This paper argues that while the embryonic
post-crisis regulatory regimes governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S.
and Europe go some distance toward addressing the regulatory challenges stem-
ming from complexity, they effectively disregard those generated by financial
innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
The intellectual origins of the ongoing global financial crisis (GFC) can
be traced back to shortcomings-blind spots-emanating from within con-
ventional financial theory. These blind spots are distorted reflections of the
perfect market assumptions underpinning the canonical theories of financial
economics: modern portfolio theory (MPT), the Modigliani and Miller
(M&M) capital structure irrelevancy principle, the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and, perhaps most importantly, the efficient market hypothe-
sis (EMH).' These theories share a common and highly stylized view of
financial markets-one characterized by, inter alia, perfect information, the
absence of transaction costs, and rational market participants. Yet in reality
financial markets-and market participants-rarely (if ever) strictly con-
form to these assumptions.2,3 Information is costly and unevenly distributed,
See discussion infra Parts I, 11 for greater detail on these theories, their centrality to the
field of financial economics, and their underlying assumptions.
2 The most notable exception arguably being public secondary markets for equity securi-
ties, where a significant body of empirical research exists to support the view that these mar-
kets generally conform to the assumptions of semi-strong form EMH. For a survey of this
empirical work, see Burton Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (Center
for Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 91, 2003); Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency,
Long- Term Returns and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. EcON. 283 (1998). Even in this context,
however, it is still unrealistic-and, indeed, actually inconsistent with the operation of the
arbitrage mechanism at the heart of conventional financial theory-to expect that markets will
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transaction costs are pervasive and often determinative, and market partici-
pants frequently exhibit cognitive biases and bounded rationality.4 Despite
these seemingly uncontroversial observations, however, the empirically
(con)testable assumptions of conventional financial theory have been trans-
formed into the central articles of faith of the ideology of modern finance:
the foundations of a widely held belief in the self-correcting nature of mar-
kets and their consequent optimality as mechanisms for the allocation of
society's resources.
The ideology of modern finance has exerted a profound influence on
how we regulate financial markets and institutions. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the pervasive belief in the social desirability of unfettered markets
represented the driving force behind the sweeping agenda of financial der-
egulation witnessed in many jurisdictions in the decades leading up to the
GFC.6 This market fundamentalism was grounded in the conviction that ra-
tional and fully informed market participants-utilizing sophisticated quan-
titative methods and the innovative financial instruments these methods
made possible-had effectively mastered risk. Public regulation, by implica-
tion, was largely relegated to a supporting role: namely, the provision of
private property rights and efficient contract enforcement necessary to sup-
port private risk-taking. Ultimately, it was this market fundamentalism that
justified turning a blind eye to the potential adverse effects of vast global
current account imbalances,7 which acquiesced to the build-up of huge
always be in equilibrium. See Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Infbrmationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcON. REv. 393 (1980).
3 As Ron Gilson has observed, it is not altogether clear whether the authors of these theo-
ries were initially attempting to describe real world financial markets or, alternatively, to pro-
vide the basis for a research agenda, which-by relaxing the perfect market assumptions-
could enhance our understanding of how these markets work in practice. See Ronald J. Gilson,
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs 17 (May
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Ultimately, at least one of these authors
did explicitly adopt the latter view. See Merton Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions
After Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON. PnRSPECTIVES 99, 100 (1988).
' Observing this divergence between theory and reality, Fischer Black, the former M.I.T.
finance professor, Goldman Sachs executive, and co-author of the Black-Scholes option pric-
ing formula, once quipped that "Markets look a lot less efficient from the banks of the Hudson
than from the banks of the Charles." PnTER BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE Gons: THE REMARKA-
BI E STORY OF RISK 7 (1996).
'See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXI FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 5, 104-09 (2010).
6 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES Xviii (2011); RICHARD POSNER, A
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009);
GEORGE CooPER, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRSIS: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES
AND THy EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (2008); Gilson, supra note 3, at 2-3; JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 5, at 68-69. The term "deregulation" does not entirely capture the breadth
or fundamental character of this trend. Indeed, it is perhaps more accurate to say that deregula-
tion during this period was characterized by significant devolution of regulation from public to
private actors and a non-interventionist stance toward the regulation of many financial markets
and institutions that emerged, developed, and matured during this period.
The influence of market fundamentalist thinking on the established wisdom underpin-
ning the post-war push to liberalize international trade and capital flows is reflected in the
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amounts of risk within the so-called 'shadow banking' system and devolved
significant responsibility for the design and implementation of capital ade-
quacy standards to the very financial institutions that were ultimately subject
to this micro-prudential regulation.' At times, it appeared as if the only ques-
tion to which 'more markets' was not the consensus answer was: where do
we turn when markets fail?
The GFC has revealed the folly of market fundamentalism as a driver of
public policy. It has also exposed conventional financial theory as funda-
mentally incomplete. Perhaps most glaringly, conventional financial theory
failed to adequately account for both the complexity of modern financial
markets and the nature and pace of financial innovation. From sub-prime
mortgages, securitization and credit default swaps (CDS) to sophisticated
quantitative models for measuring and managing risk, the footprints of com-
plexity and innovation can be observed throughout modern financial mar-
kets-and, importantly, at almost every significant step along the road to the
GFC."'1 Complexity and innovation have combined to generate significant
asymmetries of information and expertise within financial markets, thereby
comments of Stanley Fischer, former First Deputy Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF): "free capital movements facilitate a more efficient allocation of global
savings, and help channel resources into their most productive uses, thus increasing economic
growth and welfare." Stanley Fischer, Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF,
Lecture Given at the International Monetary Fund Annual Meeting (Sept. 19, 1997), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1997/091997.htm.
' The shadow banking system includes (1) non-bank financial institutions such as finance
companies, structured investment vehicles, securities lenders, money market mutual funds,
hedge funds, and U.S. government sponsored entities, and (2) financial instruments such as
repurchase agreements, asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and other de-
rivatives, insofar as these institutions and instruments perform economic functions (i.e., matur-
ity, credit, and liquidity transformation) typically associated with more "traditional" banks.
See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, THE BROOKINGS
INST. (Fall 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialfiles/programs/es/bpea/2010 fall-bpea
papers/2010b-bpeagorton.pdf; ZOLTAN POZSAR, TOBIAS ADRIAN, ADAM ASHCRAFT &
HAYLEY BOESKY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 458, SHADOW BANKING
(2010).
' As most infamously epitomized by the ill-fated Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE)
Program administered by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. See SEC. AND ExcH.
ComM'N, OFFicE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED
ENTITInS: TIE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (2008), http://www.sec-oig.gov/
Reports/Auditslnspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
1o And, indeed, the road to many previous financial crises. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GAL-
BRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929 24-27, 51-55 (1955) (describing the role of financial
innovations such as margin trading and so-called "investment trusts" in helping to fuel the
speculative bubble that ultimately precipitated the 1929 U.S. stock market crash). More recent
examples include both the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987 stock market crash and the
role of high frequency traders, automated execution algorithms, and exchange traded funds in
the so-called "flash crash" of May 6, 2010. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MKT. MECHA-
NISMS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS: SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STAIES, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, AND THE CHAIR-
MAN OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD v (1988). See generally STAFFS OF THE COMMODITY
FUURES TRADING COMM'N AND SEC. AND ExcH. COMMN TO IHE JOINI ADVISORY COMM. ON
EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010
(2010).
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opening the door to suboptimal contracting and exacerbating already perva-
sive agency cost problems." At the same time, the pace of innovation has
left financial regulators and regulation chronically behind the curve. To-
gether, complexity and innovation thus give rise to a host of regulatory chal-
lenges, the full implications of which we are only just now beginning to
understand.
Perhaps nowhere is the myopia of market fundamentalism more evident than
in connection with the pre-crisis regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) deriv-
atives markets. Over the course of the past three decades, these markets have
grown from an obscure financial backwater into a global behemoth-the
$USD700 trillion gorilla of modern financial markets. Prevailing dogma
prior to the GFC viewed the seemingly insatiable demand for many species
of OTC derivatives as a rational response to market imperfections. Supply,
in turn, was a rational response to this demand. That supply met demand
within the marketplace was then generally interpreted as being dispositive of
these instruments' private and social utility. This viewpoint was firmly
rooted in the autonomous rational actor framework underpinning MPT, the
M&M capital structure irrelevancy principle, CAPM, and the EMH. Not co-
incidentally, conventional financial theory also provided the rationale-
forcefully articulated by, among many others, U.S. Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspanl2-for why public regulatory intervention was
not necessary to ensure the safe and efficient operation of OTC derivatives
markets. This stance was ostensibly bolstered by the emergence of private
" In the context of a principal-agent (or other cooperative) relationship between two or
more parties, the term "agency costs" refers to costs incurred by the parties in connection with
the monitoring and bonding of the other parties, along with any residual (hidden) losses stem-
ming from the misalignment of incentives as between the parties. See Michael Jensen & Wil-
liam Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
12 Greenspan stated:
[P]rofessional counterparties to privately negotiated contracts also have demon-
strated their ability to protect themselves from losses, from fraud, and counterparty
insolvencies . . . . Aside from the safety and soundness regulation of derivatives
dealers under the banking and securities laws, regulation of derivatives transactions
that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary. Regulation that serves
no useful purpose hinders the efficiency of markets to enlarge standards of living.
The Regulation of OTC Derivatives: Hearings Befr)re the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan). See also Alan Greenspan, Tech-
nological Change and the Design of Bank Supervisory Policies, Remarks at the Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 1, 1997), http:/
/fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan 19970501 .pdf; Alan Greenspan,
Government Regulation and Derivatives Contracts, Remarks to the Financial Markets Confer-
ence of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Feb. 21, 1997), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1997/19970221.htm; Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Joint
Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan & Securities and Exchange Commissioner Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx; Lawrence Summers, Testi-
mony Before the Senate Banking Committee (July 31, 1998), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/rr2616.aspx.
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actors such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
along with various trade execution, clearing, and settlement platforms, to
provide the legal and operational infrastructure necessary to support the de-
velopment and growth of these new markets."
OTC derivatives markets epitomize both the complexity of modem fi-
nancial markets and the nature and pace of innovation within them. For this
reason, they offer us an illuminating window into the regulatory challenges
generated by the interaction of these powerful (and yet poorly understood)
market dynamics. Perhaps not surprisingly, these challenges ultimately stem
from the availability and allocation of a single and immensely precious com-
modity: information. How costly is it to acquire? Who has it? And, impor-
tantly, who doesn't?14 As we shall see, the answers to these and other related
questions are highly instructive in terms of how we should approach the
regulation of OTC derivatives markets-and the broader financial system-
going forward.
The objective of this paper is to start us down the path toward a more
robust understanding of the regulatory challenges that flow from complexity
and innovation within modern financial markets. It does not, however, seek
to 'correct' the blind spots of conventional financial theory. This is an impor-
tant point. What follows is not an indictment of the methodologies of posi-
tive economics from which the insights of conventional financial theory
have largely derived.' Indeed, the rigorous logic and hypothesis testing at
the core of this discipline have contributed greatly to our understanding of
the economic world. At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged
that the intellectual tools of this discipline-and the assumptions upon
which they are founded-have been (at best) misconstrued and (at worst)
hijacked by those seeking to advance the cause of market fundamentalism. 6
It is in response to this pyrrhic victory of rhetoric over reality that this
paper seeks to establish a more stable and constructive equilibrium between
financial theory and how we approach financial regulation.7 Just as market
fundamentalism has been found wanting in the wake of the GFC, so too will
any approach to regulation which favors ideological purity over the rigorous
and ongoing evaluation of the market frictions and market failures that at-
tract regulatory scrutiny and the anticipated costs and benefits of various
" See Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-
Private Divide, 11 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 155 (2010).
" And, indeed, if it can be acquired, manipulated, filtered, or analyzed within applicable
temporal, cognitive, resource, or technological constraints.
" For a robust description (and defense) of these methodologies, see Milton Friedman,
The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (Milton Friedman
ed., 1966).
16 In this respect, it is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper whether policymakers were
"true believers" in market fundamentalism or simply utilizing it for their own ends. What is
important, rather, is that this ideology influenced (either directly or indirectly) how these
policymakers approached the regulation of financial markets and institutions.
" Although certainly not a more static one.
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forms of regulatory intervention." Put somewhat differently, the only anti-
dote to ideological fervor is the systematic study of how markets-and regu-
lation-work in practice. 9
One further point of clarification is perhaps in order. This paper is not
an attempt to dissect the proximate or root causes of the GFC. Considerable
scholarly ink has already been spilled on this subject and, even then, the
debate over precisely what happened and why seems poised to rage on well
into the new millennium. 2() More importantly for the present purposes, how-
ever, while the crisis has undoubtedly served to bring these issues into
sharper focus, the regulatory challenges generated by complexity and finan-
cial innovation existed prior to, and independently of, the events and circum-
stances which culminated in the GFC.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I begins by artic-
ulating a theoretical framework for understanding complexity that conceptu-
alizes it as a function of two variables: information costs and bounded
rationality. It then examines six key drivers of high information costs (and
information failure) within modern financial markets and their points of in-
tersection with the cognitive and temporal constraints on our ability to pro-
cess information.2' Part II shifts the focus to financial innovation and
advances a theory that re-conceptualizes it as a process of change-but not
necessarily one of improvement-influenced by, inter alia, the supply-side
incentives of the principal innovators: financial intermediaries. Part III then
examines the multifaceted and mutually reinforcing relationship between
complexity and financial innovation through the lens of three case studies
drawn from the world of OTC derivatives: securitization, synthetic ex-
change-traded funds (ETFs) and collateral swaps. Leveraging these case
studies, Part IV seeks to identify the regulatory challenges generated by the
interaction of these powerful market dynamics. Part V then examines
" This paper thus adopts as its normative touchstone the evaluative framework provided
by welfare economics, pursuant to which "optimal" or "efficient" markets or regulation are
understood to be those which maximize net social welfare. Reflective of the real-world limita-
tions facing policymakers, optimal or efficient regulation will be further understood to refer to
that which maximizes net social welfare within resource and technological constraints-or,
cloaked in the jargon of welfare economics, the tangency between the utility possibilities fron-
tier and the highest attainable social welfare indifference curve (i.e. the "constrained bliss-
point"). See PER-OLOv JOHANSSON, AN INLRODCnON 10 MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS
28-29 (1991); Tm NEw PALGRAVE: AiLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS I (John
Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1989). For a more fulsome discussion of
welfare economics and its utility (and limitations) in the domain of financial regulation, see
Awrey, supra note 13, at 165-67.
19 This approach is reflected in Ronald Coase's statement that "satisfactory views on pol-
icy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and government
handle the problem of harmful effects." Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcON. 1, 10 (1960).
20 For a very useful synopsis of this literature, see Andrew Lo, Reading About the Finan-
cial Crisis: A 21-Book Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 151 (2012).
' These drivers include technology, opacity, interconnectedness, fragmentation, regula-
tion, and reflexivity. See discussion inJa Part II for greater detail.
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whether and to what extent the embryonic post-crisis regulatory regimes
governing OTC derivatives markets in the U.S. and Europe effectively re-
spond to these challenges and canvasses potential options for further reform.
Part VI concludes.
As American essayist H.L. Mencken is purported to have observed:
"for every complex problem there is an answer which is clear, simple and
wrong."2 2 Consistent with this axiom, this examination fails to generate an
obvious or straightforward set of prescriptions. As in virtually all areas of
public policy, tradeoffs abound. This paper concludes, therefore, by ex-
tracting and synthesizing the common themes flowing from this exploration
of complexity and financial innovation. These themes underscore the impor-
tance and pervasiveness of information costs, asymmetries of information
and agency cost problems within modern financial markets and, thus, the
manifest need for mechanisms that (1) subsidize the production and dissemi-
nation of information and (2) align the incentives of both public and private
actors with broader social welfare. They also highlight the nature and pace
of change within modern financial markets and the resulting desirability of
regulation designed and built with the objective of ensuring sufficient flexi-
bility, responsiveness and durability. Viewed in this light, while this paper
does not have in mind a specific destination, it can be understood as strongly
advocating certain modes-and a general direction-of travel.
I. TOWARD A MORE ROBUST THEORY OF COMPLEXITY AND ITS DRIVERS
Modern financial markets are very, very complex. This complexity is
compounded by the nature and pace of financial innovation. But what do we
mean when we say that financial markets are 'complex' and 'innovative'?
And what are the key drivers of complexity and innovation within modern
financial markets? This section (and the next) sketch out preliminary-and
at this stage largely theoretical-answers to these all-important questions.
A. An Economic Framework for Understanding Complexity
It is almost trite to observe that modern financial markets are 'com-
plex.'23 Curiously, however, scholars in the fields of both law and finance
22 Regrettably, the author was unable to unearth the original source for this oft-cited
quotation.
2 For a small sampling of the legal academic work acknowledging the complexity of
financial markets, see Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. L. REv. 211 (2009); Emilios Avgouleas, What Future for Disclosure as a Regulatory
Technique? Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond (Working Paper, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1369004; Gregory Krohn &
William Gruver, The Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008 (Working Paper,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1282250; Steven
Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ihi. L.
REv. 1 (2004).
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have expended relatively little time or effort attempting to understand this
complexity or systematically identify its potential sources. 24 25 So what makes
modern financial markets complex? We can take our first tentative steps
toward answering this question by constructing a simple (and hopefully intu-
itive) framework which conceptualizes complexity as a function of two vari-
ables. The first variable encompasses the costs incurred by actors in
connection with searching for, acquiring, filtering, manipulating and analyz-
ing information (i.e., information costs). The second variable, then, consists
of, cognitive and temporal constraints on an actor's ability to process this
information (i.e. bounded rationality). 26 In many ways, this framework
brings together, renders explicit, elaborates on, and formalizes intuitions pre-
24 At least part of the explanation for this lack of attention likely stems from the fact that
the theoretical and empirical literature examining MPT, the M&M capital structure irrelevancy
principle, CAPM, and the EHM has historically focused on the public markets for equity and,
to a lesser extent, debt securities. In a recent review of the literature examining the EMH, for
example, 53 of the 54 cited works were primarily or exclusively concerned with its application
within the context of public equity markets. See Malkiel, supra note 2. This of course makes
perfect sense: these theories implicitly rely on the existence of the secondary market liquidity
typically associated with public capital markets (in effect, to ensure the efficient operation of
the arbitrage mechanism which moves markets toward equilibrium). What is more, it is the
public nature of these markets that affords scholars access to the information necessary to
measure how rapidly new information is impacted into security prices. Simultaneously, how-
ever, it must be acknowledged that this research strategy generates an inherently biased (and
increasingly myopic) sample if one's ultimate objective is to measure the informational effi-
ciency of modern financial markets. As we shall see, the vast majority of the complexity-and
thus the information costs and bounded rationality-within modern financial markets does not
emanate from within the relatively transparent (and static) public markets for capital.
25 This is not to say, however, that scholars have not attempted to construct models de-
signed to reflect the complex dynamics of modern financial markets. See, e.g., Robert May,
Simon Levin & George Sugihara, Ecology/for Bankers, 451 NATURE 893 (2008); Robert May
& Nimalan Arinaminpathy, Systemic Risk: The Dynamics of Model Banking Systems, 46 J.
ROYAL Soc. INTERFACE 823 (2010); Prasanna Gai, Andrew Haldane & Sujit Kapadia, Com-
plexity, Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONEIARY ECON. 453 (2011). Many of these
models share a common methodology-first employed by Herbert Simon-which is, in effect,
based on identifying similarities between financial systems, on the one hand, and physical,
biological, or other social systems, on the other. See Herbert Simon, The Architecture of Com-
plexity, 106 PRoc. AM. PHIL. Soc. 467 (1962). The obvious shortcoming of this methodology,
however, is that while models drawn from other disciplines (and developed to analyze other
subject matter) might mimic the complexity of financial markets (at a given moment of time),
they fail to explain why financial markets are complex. This is the question at the heart of the
present inquiry.
26 Bounded rationality is a semi-strong form of rationality pursuant to which economic
actors are assumed to be 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.' OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OY CAPITALISM 11 (1985) (quoting HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (1957)). The concept of bounded rationality is grounded in the notion
that, if the mind is a scarce resource, there will exist cognitive and temporal constraints on our
ability to process information. The sources and species of bounded rationality and related cog-
nitive biases are themselves already the subject of a rich theoretical and experimental literature
upon which the present inquiry does not attempt to build. For a survey of this literature, see
Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler, "A Survey of Behavioral Finance" in George Constan-
tinides, Milton Harris and Ren6 Stulz, (eds.), Handbook oJ the Economics of Finance (El-
sevier, Amsterdam, 2003). See also, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin,
London, 2011).
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viously articulated by scholars such as Ron Gilson and Reinier Kraakman,27
Steven Schwarcz, 28 Henry Hu, 29 Gary Gorton,"o and Robert Bartlett. 1
As a starting point, we can envision a perfectly rational and fully in-
formed actor. This actor incurs no information costs and processes informa-
tion completely free from the distortions of bounded rationality. In effect,
the attributes of this hypothetical actor reflect the central assumptions of
conventional financial theory. Simultaneously, we can envision a real world
actor - be it a single individual or a group of individuals working together in
a firm or other organization - attempting to understand a particular constel-
lation of facts or state of the world: a 'snowball' interest rate swap; the bal-
ance sheet of a large, complex financial institution (LCFI), or the myriad of
systemic interconnections between financial markets and institutions, for ex-
ample. To fully understand this constellation of facts or state of the world,
this real world actor must invest in the acquisition, filtering, manipulation
and analysis of information.32 It may also exhibit some form and measure of
bounded rationality. The difference between our hypothetical and real world
actors can be understood in terms of their respective tolerances for
complexity.
The first important insight we can draw from this framework is that an
actor's tolerance for complexity is inherently relative." What one actor
views as immediately comprehensible, another may view as too complex to
understand. Thus, we can envision a second real world actor attempting to
understand the same constellation of facts or state of the world, but facing a
different quantum of information costs or measure (or kind) of bounded ra-
tionality. Ultimately, we would expect the differences between each actor's
information costs and bounded rationality-i.e. their relative tolerances for
complexity-to be a function of several variables. Variables specific to each
actor might conceivably include, inter alia, economies of scale in the pro-
duction or analysis of information; technological or resource constraints;
and, importantly, the actor's initial position within the constellation of facts
or state of the world in question. External variables, meanwhile, might in-
clude market structure, regulation, and other institutional features that subsi-
dize (or impede) the free flow of information and thus level (or tilt) the
informational playing field.
27 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Eficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 46 CORP. L. COMMENTATOR 173 (2004).
28 See supra note 23 for relevant work from Schwarcz.
29 See Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Information Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993).
3o See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 20-34 (Yale Int'l Center for Fin., Working Paper
No. 08-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1255362.
31 See Robert Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Deriv-
atives Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010).
32 And, where our actor is an organization, coordination costs.
3 Unless, of course, we assume that all actors are perfectly rational and fully informed.
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We might thus predict, for example, that an LCFI acting as a market
maker within an opaque, dealer-intermediated, quote-driven market might
enjoy a higher tolerance for complexity in respect of that market than, say, a
pension fund manager, a regulator, or a law professor perched high atop his
ivory tower. Put differently, we would expect to observe clear hierarchies
vis-a-vis different actors in terms of both access to information and the re-
sources needed to effectively process it. As we shall see, such hierarchies
abound within modem financial markets: hierarchies between market par-
ticipants; between market participants and regulators and, indeed, even be-
tween regulators. Ultimately, this simple observation-essentially that
complexity is a subjective phenomenon and that, as a result, different actors
may find themselves asymmetrically exposed to its dangers and opportuni-
ties-helps explain the existence and potential value of financial in-
termediaries. As explored in greater detail below, it is also the source of
many of the regulatory challenges stemming from the complexity of modem
financial markets.
The second important insight we can draw from this framework is that
our tolerance for complexity is not infinite.34 More specifically, we can envi-
sion a frontier beyond which the combination of high information costs and
bounded rationality can be expected to render full comprehension impossible
within a given timeframe. Beyond the complexity frontier, actors will be
forced to employ heuristics as a second-best strategy for understanding a
particular set of facts or state of the world.15 As we shall see, the mere ac-
knowledgement that there may exist elements of the financial system which
are so complex as to render full comprehension a practical impossibility has
potentially profound regulatory implications.
B. Six Drivers of Complexity
Armed with this provisional framework for understanding complexity,
we can embark on an examination of the sources (or drivers) of high infor-
mation costs-and information failure-within financial markets and the
points of intersection between these costs and our own bounded rationality.
Predictably, complexity itself hampers our ability to construct anything re-
sembling a complete account of these drivers or the various interactions be-
tween them. Nevertheless, taking a broad look across the financial system, it
is possible to identify at least six-in many respects intertwined and over-
3 Unless, once again, we assume that actors are perfectly rational and fully informed.
1 This is not to suggest, of course, that actors might not also elect to employ heuristics in
less complex circumstances. Ultimately, we are all satisficers. There also exists a more funda-
mental question here, although one which resides beyond the scope of this thesis, as to how to
conceptualize the behavior of market participants beyond the complexity frontier. Intuitively,
the autonomous rational actor model upon which conventional financial theory tends to rely
would seem to possess limited explanatory power beyond the point at which high information
costs and bounded rationality combine to force the use of heuristics.
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lapping-sources of complexity: technology, opacity, interconnectedness,
fragmentation, regulation and reflexivity.
As we shall see, these drivers of complexity can be broken down into
three categories: those influencing our capacity to process information, those
impacting the availability or intelligibility of the information itself and, fi-
nally, those accelerating the velocity of informational change. The lines of
demarcation between each of these categories can perhaps be clarified by
drawing an analogy with marksmanship. The first category-which includes
both financial and information technology-can be understood as relating to
both the quality of the rifle and the proficiency of the individual marksman.
The second category, meanwhile, includes drivers that-like darkness, fog,
foliage or distance-obscure the visibility of the target. Drivers falling into
this category include technology (again), opacity, interconnectedness, frag-
mentation and regulation. Lastly, we must somehow account for the fact that
the target itself may be in motion. Thus, we need a category and driver-
reflexivity-that reflects the inherent dynamism of modern financial mar-
kets. Ultimately, just as we would expect each of these factors to influence
the accuracy of the marksman's shot, so too would we expect each driver of
complexity to influence the extent to which, in practice, actors are able to
understand various constellations of facts or states of the world.
Technology
There is little doubt that advances in information technology, telecom-
munications, and financial theory over the course of the past half century
have made a positive (gross) contribution toward the informational effi-
ciency of financial markets. 6 Faster and more powerful computers have ena-
bled market participants to employ sophisticated and data-intensive
quantitative (i.e. statistical) techniques to calculate the value of financial as-
sets with greater precision and to better understand and more effectively
manage various risks." A revolution in telecommunications, meanwhile, has
made possible the almost instantaneous transmission of information to every
" See Robert Merton, Financial Innovation and the Management and Regulation of Fi-
nancial Institutions 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5096, 1995), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5096.
" Powerful computers, for example, have made possible the use of "value- at-risk" (VaR)
methodologies and portfolio stress testing to measure and manage the risk of institutional
insolvency. See Scott Frame & Lawrence White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation:
Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 120 (2004). See also Scott Frame &
Lawrence White, Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Diffusion in Banking
20-21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-10, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1434235; Lawrence White, Technological
Change, Financial Innovation, and Financial Regulation in the U.S.: The Challenges fobr Pub-
lic Policy 7 (Wharton Fin. Inst Ctr., Working Paper No. 97-33, 1997), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 8072.
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corner of the globe." Finally, breakthroughs in financial theory-perhaps
most notably the development of MPT, 9 CAPM, 4() the Black-Scholes option
pricing model (Black-Scholes), 41 and their respective progeny-have given
birth to a universe of new financial instruments which have been credited
with, among other contributions, enhancing price discovery, market liquid-
ity, and systemic resilience. In short, there exists a strong prima facie argu-
ment that these technological advancements have combined to significantly
lower information costs within modern financial markets.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, these technological advancements are
also the source of potentially significant information costs. 42 The origins of
this informational dark side can be traced back to conceptual breakthroughs
such as MPT, CAPM, and Black-Scholes, the resulting emergence of "finan-
cial science" 43 within the field of economics, and its subsequent rise to
prominence within the theory and practice of modern finance. 44 The sophisti-
cated mathematical models residing at the core of this discipline render its
theoretical underpinnings largely inaccessible to all but a relatively small
" Indeed, strong linkages between revolutions in telecommunications and finance are by
no means a recent phenomenon. From the telegraph, consolidated ticker tape, and electronic
fund transfer, to the fax, the internet, and the Blackberry, the evolution of finance is intricately
intertwined with the evolution of how we communicate with one another. See generally Ken-
neth Garbade & William Silber, Technology, Communication, and the Performance oJFinan-
cial Markets, 33 J. FIN. 819 (1978).
3 MPT flows from the premise that there is a tradeoff between risk and return. On the
basis of certain assumptions, MPT prescribes, for a given level of risk (variance), how to select
a portfolio with the highest possible return (or, conversely, for a given level of return, how to
select a portfolio with the least risk). MPT thus makes possible the construction of an efficient
frontier from which an investor can choose their desired portfolio on the basis of their individ-
ual risk preferences. One of the key insights of MPT is that an asset should not be selected on
the basis of its individual risk-return characteristics, but rather with a view to the effect of its
addition in terms of the overall risk-return characteristics of the investor's portfolio. See Harry
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); HARRUY MARKOWITZ, PoRTFoLIo SELEC-
TION: EYHICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959).
4o CAPM is used to calculate the expected rate of return on an asset to be added to a
diversified portfolio on the basis of (1) the risk free rate of return, (2) the sensitivity of the
asset to non-diversifiable (systemic) risk, and (3) the expected market return. See William
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J.
FIN. 425 (1964); JACK TREYNOR, Toward a Theory of Market Value of Risky Assets, in ASSEI
PRICING AND PORTFOIO PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
(Robert Korajczyk ed., 1999).
41 Black-Scholes is used to calculate the exact theoretical price of a real option. See
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL.
EcoN. 637 (1973). While the original Black-Scholes model technically applied to the valuation
of European options (i.e., options exercisable only at maturity), its progeny have been adapted
to value far more exotic instruments.
42 This is not to suggest that these costs outweigh the informational benefits of these tech-
nological advancements. My point here is simply that the existence of these costs contributes,
utilizing my definition, to the complexity of modern financial markets.
4 See generally Hu, supra note 29. The discipline is now generally known as financial
economics.
4 For a historical survey of this rise, see generally PETER BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE
IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL SIREEI (1992); Robert Merton, Influence of Mathe-
matical Models in Finance on Practice: Past, Present and Future, 347 PHiL. TRANSACTIONS
RoYAL Soc'y LoNDoN 451 (1994).
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handful of academic economists, along with the so-called "quants" em-
ployed by investment banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions. 45
Even in practice, the utilization of these models contemplates both informa-
tion-intensive quantitative processes and the formulation of subjective judg-
ments on the basis of accumulated technical expertise and experience in
order to generate important input variables. 46 Developing a comprehensive
understanding of financial theory and how to utilize these models in practice
thus requires an enormous upfront investment in human capital. 47 Accord-
ingly, while advances in financial theory are largely responsible for laying
the foundations of modern (and at times more informationally efficient) fi-
nancial markets, they must simultaneously be viewed as a potentially signifi-
cant driver of information costs and, thus, complexity.48
Advances in financial theory and information technology have further
contributed to the complexity of modern financial markets by making possi-
ble the development and wide-spread use of new and increasingly sophisti-
cated financial instruments. Specifically, the existence of relatively robust
markets for instruments such as OTC swaps49, asset-backed securities
(ABS),so and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 1 implicitly rely on two
4 See Richard Whitley, The Transformation of Business Finance Into Financial Econom-
ics: The Roles of Academic Expansion and Changes in U.S. Capital Markets, 11 AccI., ORG.
& Soc-v 171, 173 (1986); Hu, supra note 29, at 1470.
46 The Black-Scholes option-pricing model is a good example. Prior to the development of
Black-Scholes, market participants seeking to determine the value of an option faced a prob-
lem: namely, they were required to accurately predict, inter alia, the probability distribution of
the possible prices for the underlying asset at maturity. See Hu, supra note 29, at 1468 (citing
STEPHEN FIGLEWSKI, Theoretical Valuation Models, in FINANCIAL OPIONS: F1om THEORY TO
PRACTICE (Stephen Figlewski, William Silber & Marti Subrahmanyam eds., 1992)). Market
participants were thus required to formulate subjective judgments about the state of future
market conditions. A significant part of the (perceived) genius of Black-Scholes was that it
enabled market participants to calculate the precise theoretical value of a European option
without having to construct such a probability distribution. In reality, however, Black-Scholes
simply substituted the need to predict future asset prices with the need to predict the future
volatility of those prices.
4 Furthermore, as illustrated below, the nature and pace of financial innovation operates
so as to demand significant ongoing investment in order to preserve the value of this human
capital.
48 See Hu, supra note 29, at 1470.
4 A swap is a series of mutual forward obligations whereby two counterparties agree to
periodically exchange (or "swap") cash flows over a specified period of time. The classic
example of a swap is an interest rate swap pursuant to which one party-typically a borrower
with fixed rate obligations-agrees to make payments at a fixed interest rate to a counterparty
who in turn agrees to pay the borrower a variable (or "floating") rate. The fixed rate borrower
receiving a floating rate thus stands to benefit from any subsequent increase in interest rates,
whereas its counterparty receiving the fixed rate under the swap will benefit from any decline.
The periodic payments due under a swap are calculated with reference to what is often referred
to as a "notional amount." The resulting obligations are then typically netted out against one
another such that only one counterparty is obligated to remit payment in any given period.
"o An ABS is a security the income stream from which is backed by a pool of (typically
illiquid) underlying assets such as mortgages, automobile loans, credit card receivables, or
student loans.
" A CDO is a type of ABS typically created to hold fixed income assets such as bonds,
CDS, or frequently, other ABS.
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necessary, if not individually sufficient, conditions: (1) the development of
rational models for determining their intrinsic value, and (2) the ability to
meet the computational demands of these models within a timeframe which
enables market participants to profit from their use.52 Financial theory satis-
fies the first condition, and advances in information technology satisfy the
second.
The development of the "originate-and-distribute" 3 mortgage lending
model provides an illustrative example. Recent years have witnessed the in-
creasing use of computer-generated credit scoring tools to process residential
mortgage applications. The sub-prime mortgage market in particular was
(originally) predicated on the use of sophisticated quantitative tools to assist
lenders in better managing their exposure to high-risk borrowers.5 4 The utili-
zation of these tools served to enhance the transparency of mortgage under-
writing standards, thereby facilitating the development of a deep secondary
market for mortgages repackaged and distributed via the process of securi-
tization. 5 In very broad terms, securitization is a financing technique that
transforms non-liquid assets such as mortgages and loan receivables into
more readily alienable ABS (or MBS in the case of mortgages). 6 This is
achieved by pooling assets together and then slicing, dicing, and reconstitut-
ing the associated cash flow rights into separate tranches. On the supply
side, the design of these MBS-and especially the pricing of the tranches-
is itself heavily reliant on, once again, sophisticated financial models and
modern information technology.57 On the demand side, purchasers employ
the same technologies to measure and manage the risks associated with hold-
52 In the absence of the first condition, one would expect a wide divergence between bid-
ask spreads, ultimately leading either to very thinly traded markets or complete market failure.
In the absence of the second condition, one would expect the existence of substantial transac-
tion costs to alter the economic incentives of potential market participants, ultimately with
much the same effect. A third pre-condition for many instruments-and in particular OTC
derivatives-was the development of standardized legal documentation. See Awrey, supra
note 13, at 163.
" Or "originate-to-distribute," depending on your views respecting why financial in-
termediaries innovate. See infra Part III.
* See Frame & White, Technological Change, supra note 37, at 6.
See John Straka, A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: The 1990s Move to Automated
Credit Evaluations, 11 J. Hous. RESEARCH 207 (2000); Michael LaCour-Little, The Evolving
Role of Technology in Mortgage Finance, II J. Hous. RESEARCH 173 (2000); Susan Gates,
Vanessa Perry & Peter Zorn, Automated Underwriting in Mortgage Lending: Good News fr
the Underserved?, 13 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 369, 370, 389 (2002); Frame & White, Technologi-
cal Change, supra note 37, at 14-15.
5' Among other implications, securitization has the effect of reducing (and potentially
eliminating) lenders' exposure to borrower default. As a corollary, it also dilutes the incentives
of lenders to screen for and monitor creditor and asset quality.
5 See Frederic Mishkin, Financial Innovation and Current Trends in U.S. Financial Mar-
kets 8-9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3323, 1990), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w3323. See also Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in HANDBOOK OY
TrHE EcoNowCs or FINANCE 321-22 (George Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene Stultz
eds., 2003).
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ing these securities in their portfolios.58 At every stage of the process, finan-
cial theory and information technology combine to facilitate the
development of new financial instruments and markets. While the acronyms
may change, this same fundamental story can been observed playing out
across modern financial markets.
So how have these developments combined to render financial markets
more complex? In the wake of the GFC, it has been widely acknowledged
that even the most (ostensibly) sophisticated counterparties failed to grasp
the technical nuances of many of the new instruments and markets made
possible by the confluence of advances in financial theory and information
technology.59 Gary Gorton, for example, has observed that many market par-
ticipants did not fully appreciate how the unique structure of sub-prime
mortgages made the MBS and CDOs into which they were repackaged par-
ticularly sensitive to volatility in underlying home prices.60 Along a similar
vein, Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek, and Erik Stafford have demonstrated how
ratings agencies and other market participants failed to perceive both (1)
how the structure of CDOs (and CDO-squared61) amplified initial errors with
respect to the calculation of default risk on underlying assets, and (2) the
systematic interconnections between these assets.6 2 Advances in financial
theory and information technology have, accordingly, proven themselves to
be less than perfect tools for understanding the complex dynamics of the
very instruments and markets that they have combined to make possible.
Put simply, technology has been unable to keep pace with itself. The (net)
contribution of technology toward the complexity of modem financial mar-
kets must ultimately be measured by the extent of this imperfection.
" David Li, for example, developed a formula known as the Gaussian copula that became
widely employed prior to the GFC to evaluate the relationships between the default risks asso-
ciated with various assets held within securitization structures. See Felix Salmon, Recipe ftr
Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, WIED, Feb. 23, 2009, at 1.
" See, e.g., COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. Poi icy GRoUP III, CONTAINING SysTEMIc RISK:
THE ROAD To REFORM 53 (2008), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-
III.pdf [hereinafter CRMPG III REPoRT] (observing that "there is almost universal agreement
that, even with optimal disclosure in the underlying documentation, the characteristics of these
instruments were not fully understood by many market participants").
6o See Gorton, supra note 30, at 20-34. As Gorton explains, the unique structure of sub-
prime mortgages (specifically their short duration, step-up rates, and pre-payment penalties)
effectively provided lenders with an implicit embedded option on home prices.
61 In broad terms, a CDO-squared is simply a CDO that has invested in securities issued
by other CDOs.
62 See Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance,
23 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (2009).
6 Indeed, many of these imperfections are attributable to the unrealistic assumptions (e.g.
the existence of autonomous rational actors, perfect information, liquidity) underpinning many
financial models-assumptions that, not coincidentally, largely mirror those of conventional
financial theory.
250 [Vol. 2
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets
Opacity
A second significant driver of complexity is the opacity of many finan-
cial instruments, markets and institutions. There are in essence two species
of opacity. The first stems from the simple non-availability of information
within a particular segment of the marketplace. 64 Markets exhibiting this
form of opacity-in particular with respect to pricing information and the
identity of counterparties-have historically included those for OTC swaps,
ABS, CDOs and repurchase agreements (or "repos") 65 , along with so-called
"dark pools." 6 6 Many financial institutions also exhibit this form of opacity.
The most frequently cited example is perhaps the historical lack of trans-
parency surrounding the investors, holdings, and trading strategies of hedge
funds.67 Even traditional commercial banks, however, manifest opacity of
this variety insofar as the marketplace does not generally possess the bor-
rower or asset specific information needed to accurately determine the value
of these banks' loan books and, accordingly, the enterprise value of the lend-
ers themselves. 8 Furthermore, while banks and other financial institutions
can be expected to possess a reasonable amount of information regarding
their own counterparties, one would at the same time expect a marked de-
cline in the extent and quality of the information they possess in respect of
their counterparties' counterparties (and so on down the counterparty daisy
chain). Investors in ABS, CDOs and especially CDO-squared face an analo-
gous challenge insofar as it is often not possible to penetrate the layers of
securitization in order to evaluate the quality of the underlying assets. 9 This
" That is, the non- availability of information to a particular subset of market participants
(and, potentially, regulators).
15 A repurchase agreement is essentially a sale of securities under an agreement by which
equivalent securities are to be repurchased at a future date. The duration of these agreements
vary from overnight to months or even years, with compensation paid to the seller either in the
form of interest or as a mark-up incorporated into the repurchase price. The purchaser may also
be required by the seller to post collateral. See GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND
SECURITY 250 (Louise Gullifer ed., 2008).
" Dark pools are effectively private OTC trading platforms used to match orders inter-
nally (i.e., between clients of the same firm) and between institutional trading desks. See David
Bogoslaw, Big Traders Dive Into Dark Pools, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2007, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2007/pi2007102_394204.htm.
6 See Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Written Testi-
mony Prepared fr the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reftrm, 111th Cong. (2008)
(testimony of Andrew Lo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1301217; Willa Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TErLE L. REV. 681, 710
(2000).
61 See Robert Bartlett III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REv. 293 (2012); Don-
ald Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, 92 AM. EcON. REV.
874 (2002). But see Mark Flannery, Simon Kwan & Mahendrarajah Nimalendran, Market
Evidence on the Opaqueness of Banking Firms' Assets, 71 J. FIN. EcoN. 419 (2004).
69 See Gorton, supra note 30, at 45, 59. See also Howell Jackson, Loan Level Disclosure in
Securitization Transactions: A Problem with Three Dimensions (Harvard Law School Public
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-40, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1649657.
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first species of opacity can thus be understood as giving rise to classic asym-
metries of information.
The second species of opacity stems from the dense "information
thicket""( generated by the overwhelming volume of data swirling around
within modem financial markets. This opacity is the product of information
that, while publicly available in a strictly technical sense, is extremely (if not
prohibitively) costly to acquire, filter, manipulate, or analyze.7' The balance
sheets of LCFIs exemplify this form of opacity. The number of positions
held by LCFIs, the technical sophistication of the financial instruments used
to take these positions, and the intricate (and potentially contradictory) na-
ture of the resulting market and counterparty exposures render it virtually
impossible to construct-in a timely fashion-a comprehensive picture of
the overall risk profile of these institutions.72,73 Much of the explanation for
the growth of this information thicket in recent years can once again be
traced back to the development of new financial instruments. As described
above, the computational demands associated with many of these instru-
ments are exceedingly high.74 As explained by Robert Bartlett:
Valuing even a single CDO investment-let alone a portfolio of
such investments-requires a multi-faceted analysis of a consider-
able amount of both legal and financial data, ranging from an esti-
mation of the default and prepayment risks of hundreds
(potentially thousands) of underlying assets, analysis of the partic-
ular overcollateralization and subordination provisions attached to
particular tranches of CDO securities, and an assessment of poten-
tial counterparty risk of the CDO's various hedge counterparties.7 5
Furthermore, insofar as these instruments facilitate the reconstitution and re-
distribution of risk within the financial system (often via transactions within
relatively opaque markets), they obscure the location, nature and extent of
the ultimate exposures.76 Like the first species of opacity, the information
7o See Bartlett, supra note 31.
7 See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 23, at 222.
72 As arguably evidenced by the fact that, in retrospect, the pre-GFC CDS spreads on
LCFIs reflected significant under-pricing of the default risks associated with these institutions
(the primary counter-argument being that the low spreads reflected the so-called "too-big-too-
fail" subsidy). In fact, CDS spreads within the financial services sector suggested that risks
were at historically low levels. See FIN. SERv. AuTH., THE TURNER REviEw: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE 1O THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIs 46 (2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tur-
ner review.pdf [hereinafter TURNER REvIEw].
7 The information thicket surrounding LCFIs is exacerbated by the existence of the first
species of opacity insofar as, for example, GAAP only mandates that positions be reported in
the aggregate.
7 See Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, supra
note 23, at 13; Gorton, supra note 30, at 48-49. See also Letter from Warren Buffet to Share-
holders of Berkshire Hathaway 17 (May 2, 2009), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
20081tr.pdf; CRMPG III REPORI, supra note 59.
7 Bartlett, supra note 31, at 4.
" See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 10, 13.
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thicket manifests the potential to generate acute asymmetries of information.
Unlike the first, however, this second species of opacity thus raises the addi-
tional and rather sobering prospect that information may become altogether
"lost".77
Robert Bartlett's event study involving Ambac Financial provides a
compelling illustration of how the information thicket may result in the loss
of information.78 Ambac was and is a large, publicly-listed monoline insur-
ance company, which, prior to the GFC, was active in the business of insur-
ing multi-sector CDOs. As a result of the confluence of (1) statutory
accounting rules mandating disclosure by monoline insurers of their largest
exposures, and (2) European regulatory requirements mandating disclosure
of large volumes of legal and financial documentation in respect of insured
CDOs, it is possible to construct a relatively complete picture of Ambac's
exposures and, accordingly, its financial health.79 In 2008, a number of
CDOs insured by Ambac experienced multi-notch credit rating downgrades.
Bartlett's analysis of the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of
each of these downgrades revealed no significant reaction in Ambac's stock
price, short-selling data or the CDS spreads on its senior debt securities.")
The subsequent disclosure of these downgrades within Ambac's quarterly
earnings announcement, however, was associated with significant one-day
abnormal returns. 1 Bartlett attributes this inefficiency to the low salience of
individual CDOs within Ambac's portfolio and the logistical challenges of
processing CDO disclosures.82 In effect, however, the density of the infor-
mation thicket overwhelmed the powerful incentives possessed by market
participants to seek out and exploit such informational inefficiencies.
Interconnectedness
The ongoing process of market liberalization-aided by advances in
telecommunications 3 -has sparked a pronounced trend toward greater
globalization and integration of financial markets and institutions. This pro-
cess has generated complex linkages within and between these markets and
institutions and, importantly, the real economies they support. Financial in-
stitutions are connected to one another via their (increasingly complex)
counterparty arrangements.8 4 The balance sheets of these institutions, mean-
7 In the sense of being unknown to anyone. Gorton, supra note 30, at 45.
7 See Bartlett, supra note 31.
7 See id. at 5, 8-12.
S See id. at 23-35.
s See id. at 28. Using a single factor market model, Bartlett reports a one-day abnormal
return of negative 43%.
82 See id. at 1, 7, 48-49.
See Mishkin, supra note 57, at 10.
8 And, indeed, their counterparties' counterparty arrangements. See Ricardo Caballero &
Alp Simsek, Complexity and Financial Panics 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14997, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
1414382. Furthermore, the widespread use of collateral in connection with many of these ar-
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while, are connected to markets-and via markets to the balance sheets of
other financial institutions-through mark-to-market accounting methods. 5
These balance sheet linkages in turn generate systemic feedback effects be-
tween asset values, leverage, and liquidity." At an even higher macro level,
household savings patterns in China87 are linked to global asset values via
the resulting demand for (primarily U.S.) government securities, the conse-
quent reduction in yields on these securities, and the incorporation of these
lower yields as a proxy for the real risk-free rate into the discount rates used
in asset pricing models.
These are but a small sampling of the myriad of intricate, constantly
evolving and often undetected interconnections that shape modern financial
markets. While we have arguably come some distance in identifying and
understanding the dynamics of some of these interconnections, 9 the acquisi-
tion, analysis and ongoing monitoring of markets and institutions that this
entails comes at a high (informational) cost. Put differently, these intercon-
nections make it more costly to identify and monitor potential sources of risk
within the financial system.9o What is more, the sheer number of these link-
ages, their intricacy, and their rapid evolution suggest that our ability to
rangements can generate linkages between the relevant counterparties (and markets) and prices
within the markets for the collateral assets. During the GFC, for example, decreases in the
value of senior tranches of sub-prime MBS held as collateral in the repo market triggered what
eventually became the complete paralysis of this market. See Zachary Gubler, Instruments,
Institutions and The Modern Process of Financial Innovation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 82-83
(2011).
1 Mark-to-market or "fair value" accounting refers to the practice, reflected in Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), of accounting for the value of an asset on the basis of its current market price, the
market price of similar assets or, if neither is available, another metric of "fair" value.
"6 The basic (spiral) pattern of these effects can be summarized as follows: (1) rising asset
values inflate bank balance sheets, allowing them to extend greater leverage, (2) the resulting
expansion of credit stimulates demand for assets and liquidity, and (3) increased demand for
assets and liquidity has the effect of inflating prices while simultaneously reducing the liquid-
ity premium on the assets. These effects operate in reverse in an environment of falling asset
prices. See Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Financial Cycles, Presentation to
the 6th BIS Annual Conference (June 18-19, 2007), http://www.bis.org/events/brunnenO7/
shinpres.pdf; Int'l Monetary Fund, Assessing the Systemic Implications of Financial Linkages,
in Gi OBAL FINANCIAL STABLITY REPORT (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/externall
pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/0 I /pdf/chap2.pdf.
Or, more precisely, China's resulting current account surplus (combined with its man-
aged exchange rate regime).
" See TURNER REviw, supra note 72, at 1- 13. This has a double-barreled effect in terms
of stimulating demand: (1) lower yields on U.S. government securities reduce real interest
rates (thereby making it cheaper to employ leverage to purchase assets) and (2) the incorpora-
tion of lower yields into discount rates reduces risk premiums (thereby making the assets
themselves cheaper).
' For an overview of some of the tools used to evaluate systemic linkages within the
financial system (including the network approach, co-risk models, distress dependence matri-
ces and default intensity models), see Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 86. For a critique of
these tools, see Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008).
G0 See Avgouleas, supra note 23, at 22. Indeed, as explored in greater detail in/ra Parts V
& VI, OTC derivatives offer a compelling example of such interconnectedness and how costly
it can be to monitor.
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identify and understand them will ultimately be constrained by bounded ra-
tionality. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that many of these intercon-
nections are only revealed (or their importance fully understood) at the point
at which they become channels for the transmission of financial shocks. Ul-
timately, interconnectedness represents a significant source of opacity-and
thus complexity-within modern financial markets.
Fragmentation
One of the most striking features of many of the transactions that exem-
plify modern financial markets is the extent to which they result in the frag-
mentation of economic interests. The archetypal example of this is
securitization. As Kate Judge explains, by repackaging underlying assets
such as mortgages into ABS, repackaging ABS into CDOs, and CDOs into
CDO-squared, securitization transforms what was initially, in many in-
stances, a bilateral relationship into a complex web involving potentially
hundreds of dispersed counterparties."' Judge has coined the term "fragmen-
tation nodes" 92 to describe this category of transactions. Each successive
fragmentation node attenuates the informational and economic relationship
between counterparties and the underlying assets in which they have, ulti-
mately, invested." This attenuation has the double-barreled effect of (1) in-
creasing information and coordination costs for counterparties and (2)
diluting their incentives to coordinate their activities or invest in the acquisi-
tion of information.94 Like interconnectedness, fragmentation thus represents
a potentially significant driver of opacity within modern financial markets.'
Regulation
The complexity of modem financial markets is further compounded by
the complexity of the regulatory regimes that govern them. This regulatory
complexity manifests both substantive and structural elements. Substantive
regulatory complexity stems from what U.S. Senator Charles Schumer and
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, speaking in reference to the U.S.
regulatory landscape, have characterized as the "thicket of complicated
rules,"96 which have built up over time within many regulatory regimes. The
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
" See Kate Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity
and Systemic Risk, STANFORD L. REv. 101, 104-05, 127, 139 (2011).
92 See id. at 105.
§ See id.
94 See id. at 104.
1 See id. at 105.
6 McKINSEY & Co., SUSTAINING NEw YORKS AND THE US' GiOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP ii (2007).
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Act,97 to take one example, runs to 848 pages, is estimated to require up to
243 new federal regulations," and is believed by many-no doubt speaking
with a touch of hyperbole-to manifest a "trillion unintended conse-
quences."99 This comes on top of the substantial pre-existing edifice of fed-
eral securities laws, regulations and jurisprudence governing U.S. financial
markets. Synthesizing this regulation-to say nothing of staying abreast of
new regulatory developments-represents no small challenge for either mar-
ket participants or financial regulators.
Structural regulatory complexity, meanwhile, stems from the discon-
nect between the increasingly globalized and integrated structure of many
financial markets and institutions, on the one hand, and the fragmentation
exhibited within and between many regulatory regimes, on the other."" In
the U.S., for example, federal responsibility for financial regulation is cur-
rently divided between a cacophony of regulators including the Federal Re-
serve Board, Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA), and Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB).u)' A similar degree of regulatory fragmenta-
tion can be observed within the E.U., where the new European Systemic
Risk Board, European Banking Authority, European Securities and Market
Authority, and European Institutional and Occupational Pensions Authority
must coordinate their activities both with each other and with national super-
visors in each of the bloc's 27 member states.'102 This regulatory fragmenta-
tion results in higher information costs for both market participants (seeking
to understand and comply with regulation) and regulators (seeking to coordi-
nate their activities).'()' What is more, the inevitable gaps generated by this
fragmentation open the door to regulatory arbitrage.104 As we shall see, these
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
" This estimate was made by New York law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell. The Uncer-
tainty Principle, WALL S1. J., July 14, 2010, at A18.
9 A Trillion Unintended Consequences, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2010, at A16.
"oo See Merton, supra note 36, at 31.
"0 Compounding this fragmentation, many segments of the U.S. financial services indus-
try are also highly regulated at the state level.
102 For an overview of the new structure of financial supervision in the E.U., see Financial
Supervision, EUR. Comm'N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/committees/index en.
htm (last visited Mar 30, 2012). See also Eilis Ferran, Understanding the New Institutional
Architecture of E.U. Financial Market Supervision (Cambridge Univ. Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 29/2011, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1701147.
ios Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation and the Curious Case of OTC Deriva-
tives, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 101 (2010).
04 See the discussion infra Part IV for greater detail. The term "regulatory arbitrage"
refers to transactions or strategies designed to exploit gaps or differences within or between
regulatory regimes, ultimately with the intention of either reducing costs or capturing profits.
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gaps can also provide the stimulus for financial innovation and, as a result,
contribute still further to the complexity of modem financial markets.
Reflexivity
Complexity does not exist independently of the observer.I" It is observ-
ers, after all, who incur information costs and who are inevitably constrained
by bounded rationality. Yet we are not simply passive observers within fi-
nancial markets: we are participants. Economists develop theories of market
behavior, which in turn influence the very behavior of market participants
whom economists seek to understand." Asset values affect our perception
of risk, which affects the availability of credit, which affects asset values."
Regulators introduce rules designed to constrain the behavior of market par-
ticipants, incentivizing market participants to find ways of circumventing
these constraints, thereby necessitating further regulatory intervention." The
interactions between the cognitive perceptions of market participants and
regulators, the actions predicated on these perceptions, and the impact of
these actions within markets, generate complex and often self-reinforcing
feedback loops. George Soros has characterized the interference created by
these feedback loops as "reflexivity.""' As Soros explains:
In situations that have thinking participants, there is a two-way
interaction between the participants' thinking and the situation in
which they participate. On the one hand, participants seek to un-
derstand reality; on the other, they seek to bring about a desired
outcome. The two functions work in opposite directions: in the
cognitive function reality is the given; in the participating func-
tion, the participants' understanding is the constant. The two can
interfere with each other by rendering what is supposed to be
given, contingent. . . Reflexivity renders the participants' under-
standing imperfect ...
Further explaining:
The imperfection I am concerned with arises because we are par-
ticipants. When we act as outside observers we can make state-
See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CoRP.
L. 211, 211 n.1 (1997).
1os A fact that is reflected in the framework for understanding complexity set out above.
1o' See DONALD MACKENZn, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA (2006).
11o To clarify, asset values affect our perception of risk (and thus the availability of credit)
primarily by impacting the value of the collateral pledged and received in connection with the
extension of credit.
1o' Edward Kane has characterized this interaction as the "regulatory dialectic." Edward
Kane, Technology and the Regulation ofFinancial Markets, in TECHNOLOGY AND LHE REGULA-
TION or FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECuRIrs, FUTURES AND BANKING 187-93 (Anthony Saunders
& Lawrence White eds., 1986).
1o9 GEORGE SoRos, THE Al cVMy OF FINANCE 2 (2003).
o (Id. at 2.
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ments that do or do not correspond to the facts without altering the
facts; when we act as participants, our actions alter the situation
we seek to understand."'
The incursion of information costs with a view to better understanding the
complex dynamics of financial markets (whether in search of knowledge or
profit or as a means of achieving regulatory ends) will thus invariably alter
these dynamics, thereby demanding the incursion of further information
costs.112 It is a game without an end. Furthermore, our location within the
object of study-indeed, ultimately, as the object of study-would, intui-
tively, seem likely to magnify the extent of our bounded rationality. Accord-
ingly, while many economists have tended to shy away from the utilization
of concepts such as reflexivity, any systematic attempt to understand the
drivers of complexity within modem financial markets must somehow ac-
count for this uniquely human element.
Technology, opacity, interconnectedness, fragmentation, regulation and
reflexivity together generate significant information costs and set us on a
collision course with our own bounded rationality. In the process, they drive
financial markets toward-and potentially beyond-the complexity frontier:
often leading these markets to function in very different ways from those
posited by conventional financial theory. Indeed, this process is in many
ways the defining feature of what I have characterized as modern financial
markets. Yet this is only one half of the story. To more fully appreciate the
regulatory challenges posed within modern financial markets we must also
examine the unique nature of financial innovation and, ultimately, the im-
portant relationship between complexity and innovation. In many respects,
this examination boils down to a single question: who benefits from the com-
plexity of modern financial markets?
II. TOWARD A SUPPLY-SIDE THEORY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
The word "innovation" brings to mind products and processes-the
printing press, indoor plumbing, penicillin, the designated hitter, etc.-
which have unequivocally made the world a better place. Economists, how-
ever, employ the term in a somewhat more expansive (and, on the surface at
least, less normative) fashion to describe unanticipated shocks to the econ-
omy."' Yet beneath this veneer of academic objectivity there survives a
marked tendency within the literature to view these unanticipated shocks as
being more in the nature of "unforecastable improvements."114 This view
.. Id. (emphasis added).
112 See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 238.
'1 Along with the responses of economic actors to these shocks. See Tufano, supra note
57, at 310.
'1 Merton Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last 20 Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 459, 460 (1986) (emphasis added). See also Frame & White, supra
note 37 ("Profit- seeking enterprises and individuals are constantly seeking new and improved
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seems likely to have been influenced by Joseph Schumpeter's conception of
innovation as the catalyst of the "Creative Destruction" that fuels growth
within capitalist economies.115 As Schumpeter explains:
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine
in motion comes from the new consumers, goods, the new meth-
ods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new
forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.'16
Continuing:
The opening up of new markets, foreign and domestic, and the
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to
such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of indus-
trial mutation-if I may use the biological term-that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly de-
stroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process
of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism." 7
While Schumpeter himself may not necessarily have espoused this
view, it is not difficult to see how one might interpret his analysis as equat-
ing innovation-in the form of new goods, methods of production or forms
of industrial organization-with progress. Indeed, Schumpeter's utilization
of biological terminology is evocative of a Darwinian survival of the fittest.
As will soon become apparent, however, the welfare implications of finan-
cial innovation are not nearly so straightforward."' This indeterminacy
points to the desirability of a more cautious, less value-laden understanding
of financial innovation as an ongoing process of experimentation whereby
new institutions, instruments, techniques and markets are (or are perceived
to be) created." 9 Ultimately, framing our understanding of financial innova-
tion as simply a process of (perceived) change-and not necessarily one of
improvement-has profound implications in terms of the way we look at
modern financial markets.
products, processes, and organizational structures that will reduce their costs of production,
better satisfy customer demands, and yield greater profits . . . . When successful, the result is
an innovation." [emphasis added]); id. ("We define financial innovation as something new
that reduces costs, reduces risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument that bet-
ter satisfies financial system participants' demands."); Merton, supra note 36, at 6 ("Looking
at financial innovations . . . one sees them as the force driving the global financial system
towards its goal of greater economic efficiency.").
"' See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 119 (1975).
'
6 Id. at 82-83.
"7 Id. at 83.
"' See Robert Litan, In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation, THE BROOK-
INGS INST. (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edulpapers/2010/0217 financial innova-
tion litan.aspx; James Van Horne, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, 40 J. FIN. 621
(1985); Tufano, supra note 57, at 327-29.
'' See Tufano, supra note 57, at 309. See generallv Gubler, supra note 84.
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A. The Conventional View: Financial Innovation as a Demand-Side
Response to Market Imperfections
We know relatively little about what stimulates financial innovation.
The dominant economic view, grounded in Proposition I of the M&M capi-
tal structure irrelevancy principle,12() envisions financial innovation as a ra-
tional demand-side response to market imperfections.12 ' These
imperfections-many of which are themselves the products of exogenous
changes to the economic environment 2 -include, inter alia, regulation and
taxes 23; incomplete marketsl2 4; transaction costs 25 ; asymmetries of informa-
tion and the ensuing agency costs 2 6 ; and other inefficiencies that constrain
the ability of market participants to maximize their utility functions. Follow-
ing this view, these imperfections generate demand for financial innovations,
which promise, among other things, greater choice, lower costs, enhanced
liquidity and more effective risk management.'27 Figure 1 depicts the rela-
tionship between issuers and investors in an M&M world.
Viewed in this light, for example, the extreme interest rate volatility of
the 1970s and early 1980s lead to innovations such as adjustable rate mort-
gages, variable-rate certificates of deposit, financial futures, and interest rate
swaps.128 U.S. regulatory constraints on the remuneration arrangements, eli-
gible investors, and trading strategies of registered investment companies
12) The M&M capital structure irrelevancy principle advances, on the basis of certain as-
sumptions, that the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure (i.e., its mix of equity,
debt, and other capital). See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo-
ration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcON. REv. 261 (1958). The assumptions
underlying the M&M principle include, inter alia, the absence of (1) information costs (and
thus asymmetries of information and agency cost problems), (2) bankruptcy costs, and (3)
taxes. In a world where these assumptions held true, the M&M principle would suggest that
there should be no demand for financial innovation (at least in terms of security design).
121 See Tufano, supra note 57, at 313-14. For more recent work in which the dominance of
this demand-side view is evident, see generally Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, FoNDAZIONE ENi ENRICO MATTEI (May
2010), http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attachl20109211528484NDL2010-114.pdf.
122 See Mishkin, supra note 57, at 1.
123 See, e.g., Frame & White, supra note 37, at 9; Mishkin, supra note 57, at 11; Kane,
supra note 108; Miller, supra note 114; Van Horne, supra note 118, at 623-24.
124 See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Rohit Rahi, Financial Market Innovation and Security De-
sign: An Introduction, 65 J. EcON. THEORY 1 (1985); Tufano, supra note 57, at 314; Van
Horne, supra note 118.
125 See, e.g., Robert Merton, On the Application of the Continuous Time Theory of Finance
to Financial Intermediation and Insurance, 14 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK INS. 225 (1989).
126 See, e.g., Tufano, supra note 57, at 315. For a survey, see generally Milton Harris &
Artur Raviv, The Design ofJSecurities, 24 J. FIN. EcON. 55 (1989); FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUG-
LAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 144-47 (1994).
127 See e.g., Tufano, supra note 57, at 313-14 (citing ROBERT MERTON, OPERATION AND
REGULATION IN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: A FUNCTIONAL PnRSPECTIVE (Peter Englund, ed.,
1993)); Robert Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT.
23 (1995); BANK FOR INT'r SETTLEMENTS, RECENT INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
(Apr. 1986), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ecscOla.pdf.
128 See Hu, supra note 29, at 1466; Mishkin, supra note 57, at 2-5; Van Horne, supra note
118, at 622-23.
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and advisers spurred the development of hedge funds, and the thirst for yield
on fixed income investments in the low interest rate environment of the
2000s stimulated demand for, inter alia, new forms of CDOs and synthetic
CDOs domiciled in tax efficient jurisdictions such as Ireland and the Cay-
man Islands. 12 9
FIGURE 1: INNOVATION IN AN M&M WORLD
(Innovative)
Economic Claims
However, while this demand-side story is important, it paints a funda-
mentally incomplete picture. First, it is deeply rooted in the Schumpeterian
paradigm in which the intersection of supply and demand are too frequently
viewed as being dispositive of an innovation's private and social utility. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, it fails to adequately account for the incentives
of the institutions at the center of the market for financial innovation: it
ignores the role of financial intermediaries.
FIGURE 2: INNOVATION IN A WORLD WITH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Capital
Financial Inves
Market Intermediary Innovation
Access
Economic Claims
129 See Adair Turner, Chairman, Financial Services Authority, Speech at The Economist's
Inaugural City Lecture: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation (Jan. 21,
2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0121 at.shtml, explaining
that a reduction in medium and long-term real risk free rates "had driven among investors a
ferocious search for yield-a desire among any investor who wishes to invest in bond-like
instruments to gain as much as possible spread above the risk-free rate, to offset at least par-
tially the declining risk-free rate."
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B. The Supply-side View: Financial Intermediaries as a Driver
of Innovation
Curiously, the supply-side dynamics of financial innovation have been
largely overlooked by both academics and policymakers. So who are the
primary suppliers of financial innovation and what are their incentives to
innovate? The suppliers are, by and large, financial intermediaries such as
commercial and investment banks, securities dealers, investment funds and
insurance companies. At first glance, the incentives of these intermediaries
might appear relatively straightforward: profit." In a competitive environ-
ment, however, one would expect these profits to rapidly erode as imitators
enter the marketplace, attract market share and drive down margins."'1 One
would further expect the rate of this profit erosion-and thus the inclination
of financial institutions to innovate-to be a function of the diffusion speed
of the innovation.
We would thus expect the incentives of potential innovators to be rela-
tively muted in the absence of some means of preventing imitators from
freely appropriating the innovation. This is the traditional economic justifi-
cation-articulated by Schumpeter and others-for the extension of intellec-
tual property rights to innovators.'32 By granting innovators a temporary
monopoly on the fruits of their invention, these rights provide the economic
incentives (i.e. rents) necessary to spur innovation. The problem, of course,
is that intellectual property rights do not extend to the vast majority of finan-
cial innovations.' JPMorgan cannot patent a CDO structure. 13 4 Goldman
"o See Mishkin, supra note 57, at 1.
'.. See Van Horne, supra note 118, at 622. What little empirical evidence exists on this
front (at least with respect to financial innovation) is inconclusive and not altogether relevant
to the present inquiry. In a widely cited empirical study of financial innovations from 1976 to
1984, Peter Tufano found that financial intermediaries did not charge higher prices in the brief
"monopoly" period before imitations appeared and, in the long-run, charged lower prices than
rivals offering imitative products. Tufano did find, however, that innovating banks captured a
larger share of underwriting business for the relevant products than did imitators. See Peter
Tufano, Financial Innovation and First Mover Advantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 213 (1989).
In a more recent study, Kenneth Carrow found an inverse relationship between the number of
imitators and the size of underwriting spreads. See Kenneth Carrow, Evidence of Early Mover
Advantages in Underwriting Spreads, 15 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 37, 37 (1999). Neither study,
however, is particularly illuminating or immediately relevant insofar as (1) their research was
focused exclusively on innovations within markets for publicly-traded securities and (2)
neither researcher looked beyond underwriting spreads to examine other potential benefits-
the informational advantages associated with market-making or reputational effects, for exam-
ple-derived from being an innovator.
132 See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfire and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention, in THE RATE AND DmECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIvITy: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FAc-
TORS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, ed., 1962); Avinash Dixit & Joseph Stiglitz,
Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. EcON. REv. 297 (1977);
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZAION (1988).
... Outside the limited scope of business method patents. See State St. Bank v. Signature
Fin., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, one would expect such patents to be of limited
practical application in the context of financial innovation insofar as the application process
contemplates public disclosure as a precondition to protection. More specifically, it is likely
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Sachs cannot copyright the acronym "CDS." It is perhaps unsurprising,
therefore, that the diffusion rates of many financial innovations are excep-
tionally high."' As a corollary, we would expect to observe relatively little
innovation. Yet this is precisely the opposite of what we often see occurring
within modern financial markets. This observation suggests that we need to
develop a better understanding of why financial intermediaries innovate.
The key insight is derived from understanding that financial in-
termediaries possess at least three very different incentives to innovate. First,
as previously acknowledged, they innovate in response to the emergence of
'genuine' demand within the marketplace. Second, they often possess their
own incentives stemming from, for example, the desire to mitigate the im-
pact of various regulatory requirements. A prime example of this, examined
in greater detail in Part IV, is the use (and adaptation) of securitization tech-
niques by banks to circumvent capital adequacy requirements. Third, finan-
cial intermediaries possess supply-side incentives to design and implement
strategies with the intention of recreating the monopolistic conditions-usu-
ally afforded by the protection of intellectual property rights-which allow
for the ongoing extraction of rents. There are at least two such strategies, and
together, they help reveal the multifaceted relationship between complexity
and financial innovation.
The first strategy involves artificially accelerating the pace of innova-
tion." 6 Financial intermediaries engage in this strategy for the purpose of
achieving product differentiation 37-not only vis-h-vis the innovations of
their competitors but, crucially, between previous generations of their own
innovations. In this respect, this strategy is broadly analogous to the short-
term "planned obsolescence" through innovation observed within, inter
alia, the fashion, consumer electronics, software, and academic textbook in-
dustries."' This strategy does not necessarily rely on the existence of any
that financial intermediaries will in many instances find such disclosure unpalatable for strate-
gic reasons. This intuition finds empirical support in the form of studies finding that the deci-
sion in State Street did not have an appreciable impact on the number of patent applications
filed by financial firms. See generally Robert Hunt, Business Method Patents and U.S. Finan-
cial Services (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 08-10, 2008), available
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wpO8-
10.pdf; see also Steven Pokotilow & Ian DiBernardo, Protection for Financial Indices, ETFs
and Other Products, 263 N.Y. L.J. (2006), for a discussion of the limits on intellectual prop-
erty rights in financial indices and ETFs in the U.S.
1' For an inside look at the development of CDOs by JPMorgan Chase & Co., see gener-
ally GiILIAN TETT, Fooi,'s GoinD: How TEI BoiD DREAM OF A SMALi TRIBE AT i.P. MORGAN
WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHIED A CATASTROPIm (2009).
' See Hu, supra note 29, at 1484. Although, as we shall see, this diffusion is in many
cases limited to a relatively small group of financial intermediaries.
I See id. at 1479; Henry Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfire, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1991).
See Tufano, supra note 57, at 309.
' Very briefly, planned obsolescence is a strategy pursuant to which producers intention-
ally design products that are no longer functional or fashionable beyond a certain limited
period of time. For a timely real world example of this strategy, readers might look to Apple's
relatively frequent releases of new versions of its iPhone and iPad products (and, concomi-
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natural demand in the marketplace, nor on the innovation itself being "new"
in any material respect. Rather, it can theoretically be premised on little
more than, for example, capitalizing on investor short-termism, other behav-
ioral factors, or simply tapping the instinctive human desire for the "next
new thing.""' The practical effect of this strategy is to reset the diffusion
clock 4()-in essence creating more (albeit shorter) monopoly-like periods-
thereby enabling intermediaries to extract greater rents from their innova-
tions.141 Importantly, this strategy also manifests the potential to generate
what U.K. FSA Chairman Adair Turner has characterized as "socially use-
less" 42 over-innovation.
The second strategy employed by financial intermediaries in response
to the appropriability problem is to embrace complexity as an integral com-
ponent of their business models. More specifically, many financial in-
termediaries have harnessed technology (and especially financial theory) to
develop-and move an increasingly large proportion of their business activi-
ties into-new and relatively opaque institutions, instruments and markets.143
They have also lobbied fiercely against regulatory reforms, which would
seek to achieve, among other objectives, a leveling of the informational
playing field.144 Interestingly, this confluence of technology and opacity has
not necessarily been utilized, as one might predict, to thwart imitators and
thereby slow the diffusion rate of innovation.145 Indeed, small groups of fi-
nancial intermediaries have often collaborated in the development of new
tantly, the overwhelming demand for these products even among customers owning previous
generations of them). See generally Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Upgrades, Tradeins and
Buybacks, 29 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1998); Michael Waldman, Planned Obsolescence and the
R&D Decision, 27 RAND J. ECON. 583 (1996); Michael Waldman, A New Perspective on
Planned Obsolescence, 108 Q. J. EcON. 273 (1993). See also Glenn Ellison & Drew
Fudenberg, The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry, 31 RAND
J. EcON. 253 (2000); Laurence Miller, Jr., On Killing Off the Market fr Used Textbooks and
the Relationship Between Markets fr New and Secondhand Goods, 82 J. PoI,. EcON. 612
(1974).
s' See Van Horne, supra note 118, at 626. Or, in the case of academic textbooks, having a
captive audience.
14 Who, after all, would want to imitate previous innovations now viewed as being
outmoded?
Primarily in the form of higher underwriting spreads.
'4 Phillip Inman, Financial Services Authority Chairman Backs Taxon "Socially Useless"
Banks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/aug/27/fsa-bo-
nus-city-banks-tax.
' This of course makes perfect sense given the expectation of higher profit margins
within such markets.
"See Gary Rivlin, The Billion Dollar Bank Heist, DAILY BEAST (July 11, 2011), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/10/the-billion-dollar-bank-heist.html; Edwar Wy-
att & Eric Lichtblau, A Finance Overhaul Fight Draws a Swarm of Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMS,
Apr. 19, 2010, at Al; Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, Bankers Lobby Against Financial
Regulatory Overhaul, WASH. POST. Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805370.html.
' The most notable exception to this likely being a financial institution's investment strat-
egies, where opacity is employed specifically with a view to preventing imitation.
264 [Vol. 2
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets
financial instruments, markets, and institutions.1 46 The resulting complexity
has instead often been used by intermediaries as a group to prevent the com-
moditization of many financial innovations, ultimately forestalling the redis-
tribution of rents from innovators to consumers which one might otherwise
expect to take place over time.147 Within more arcane and opaque markets,
these rents flow not only from higher underwriting spreads but also the in-
formational advantages derived from the role financial intermediaries play as
market-makers.148 It is in their quest to maximize and exploit their compara-
tive informational advantage that financial intermediaries have thus driven
us toward-and beyond-the complexity frontier.
This, of course, begs an important question: why would consumers of
financial innovation-upon learning of the existence and potential use of
these strategies-not take appropriate countermeasures? More specifically,
why would rational and fully informed consumers not (1) apply a "lemons"
discount, (2) insist on the utilization of costly contracting mechanisms de-
signed to reveal information about the quality of the innovation, or (3) re-
fuse to transact with financial intermediaries which they suspected of
engaging in these strategies?149 As a preliminary matter, one might observe
that these consumers' lower tolerance for complexity would impede this
learning process. 5i However, while this would almost certainly be true on
one level, the relevant question simply becomes: why would consumers-or
competing financial intermediaries-with a higher tolerance for complexity
not share the fruits of their knowledge with less sophisticated consumers?
Why, in other words, would this information not ultimately find its way into
the broader marketplace?
There are a number of potential explanations for this type of market
failure. A model developed by Xavier Gabaix and David Laisbon, for exam-
ple, demonstrates how "shrouding"-the process by which producers hide
information from consumers respecting high priced add-ons-can flourish
even in highly competitive markets.'15 Gabaix and Laisbon's model proceeds
on the basis of a distinction between "sophisticated" and "myopic" con-
"' See generally Awrey, supra note 13, for an exploration of how financial intermediaries
and other private actors-and ISDA in particular-have collaborated in the development of
OTC derivatives markets.
' And, simultaneously, preventing a potentially costly innovation "arms race" between
competing financial intermediaries.
14 Including, inter alia, (1) pricing and counterparty information and (2) lower search
costs for underwriting opportunities. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the market-making
role played by financial intermediaries within OTC derivatives markets.
"' Ultimately dis-incentivizing their use. For a theoretical discussion of the so-called
"lemons" (i.e., adverse selection) problem, see George Akerlof, The Marketfor Lemons, 84 Q.
J. EcON. 488 (1970).
Iso Indeed, one would expect that artificially accelerating the pace of innovation would
itself impede this process.
' See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. EcoN. 505 (2006).
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sumers.152 Using examples drawn from the banking,' hospitality,15 4 and of-
fice product industries,' Gabaix and Laisbon then illustrate how producers
utilize marketing strategies that obscure high-priced add-ons (often in the
"fine print") with the objective of exploiting myopic customers who, by
definition, fail to recognize that the proverbial wool is being pulled over
their eyes. Sophisticated customers-who can see through the shrouding-
then exploit the marketing schemes designed to target myopic customers by,
for example, opting out of the add-ons. The result is an equilibrium in which
producers, competitors offering close substitutes, 6 and sophisticated con-
sumers 5 7 have no incentive to "de-bias" myopic customers by revealing the
existence or true cost of the add-ons.5 8 Gabaix and Laisbon further observe
that, over the long run, shrouding may be sustained by, inter alia, the en-
trance of new myopic customers; the development of new shrouding tech-
niques, or importantly, new rounds of innovation."'
Second, even where these strategies are transparent to the marketplace,
there remains the fundamental issue of market access. For example, as we
will examine in greater detail in Part IV, the dealer intermediated structure
of OTC derivatives markets-combined with the economies of scale associ-
ated with market making6 0-has resulted in the concentration of trading ac-
tivity within a small oligopoly of financial intermediaries. What is more,
virtually all of these intermediaries are LCFIs. Market participants looking
to utilize OTC derivatives have thus historically enjoyed a limited menu of
counterparty options outside these powerful and opaque institutions. This in
turn is likely to have diluted the impact of any market discipline that might
have otherwise been brought to bear on those intermediaries who engage in
strategies designed to extract rents from their higher tolerance for
complexity.
All of this is not to suggest that this nascent supply-side theory of fi-
nancial innovation fully encapsulates the incentives-or explains the behav-
ior-of all financial intermediaries, in all markets, at all times. Demand-side
factors are clearly important. Nor am I suggesting that financial in-
152 And the existence of both in the marketplace. See id. at 510.
' Where various ATM, minimum balance ,and other fees are often shrouded. See id. at
506.
1 Where hotels, for example, shroud add-ons such as parking, telecommunications and
room service charges. See id. at 507-08.
' Where printer manufacturers, for example, often advertise low prices for inkjet print-
ers, but not the (far higher) cost of patented ink cartridges. See id. at 506.
151 Who risk de-biasing their own consumers.
117 Who can be understood as receiving a subsidy from the marketing strategies designed
to exploit myopic consumers. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 151, at 509-10.
s See id.
'
5 See id. at 522-23.
16o More specifically: (1) the informational benefits derived from access to a larger pro-
portion of overall trading activity (i.e. deal flow) and (2) the hedging benefits derived from
being able to trade with a larger number of counterparties, looking to take a larger (and more
diverse) number of exposures.
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termediaries have engaged in some sort a grand conspiracy to make financial
markets more complex. What I am suggesting, however, is that re-conceptu-
alizing financial innovation as a process of change influenced by the incen-
tives of innovators-who have the most to gain and possess a comparative
informational advantage-can enhance our understanding of the complex
and rapidly evolving dynamics within modem financial markets. What is
more, re-conceptualizing financial innovation in this light serves to illumi-
nate the regulatory challenges stemming from the interaction of complexity
and innovation. We will turn our attention to these challenges in a moment.
First, however, it is important to unpack the multifaceted relationship be-
tween complexity and financial innovation.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPLEXITY AND FINANCIAL
INNOVATION: THREE CASE STUDIES
As may already be apparent, complexity and financial innovation are
mutually reinforcing dynamics. This symbiosis can be observed across at
least four dimensions. First, as described above, complexity can be utilized
by financial intermediaries for the purpose of preventing the commoditiza-
tion of an innovation. Second, financial intermediaries that enjoy a higher
tolerance for complexity relative to other market participants (and regula-
tors) can exploit this advantage-i.e. extract rents-by offering "innova-
tive" products and services which their clients may not fully understand.
Third, newer and more innovative financial instruments invariably demand
the incursion of high (initial) information costs on the part of both market
participants and regulators. What is more, these instruments often (1) trade
within less developed and more opaque markets and (2) generate unantici-
pated and undetected interconnections within and between financial markets
and institutions, thereby exacerbating complexity. Finally, insofar as finan-
cial innovation is employed as a reflexive response to changes in the prevail-
ing regulatory environment, both this innovation and the regulation that
spawned it can be viewed as contributing to the complexity of modern finan-
cial markets.
A. Complexity and Financial Innovation within OTC
Derivatives Markets
There exists no shortage of potential case studies illustrating various
dimensions of the relationship between complexity and financial innovation.
Three particularly compelling examples, however, are securitization, syn-
thetic ETFs, and collateral swaps. It should come as no surprise that all three
of these case studies are drawn from the world of OTC derivatives.161 OTC
161 Nor that they are drawn from the vast, opaque, and intricately interconnected plumbing
of the shadow banking system.
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derivatives markets have long been recognized at hotbeds of financial inno-
vation. 16 2 Perhaps more importantly, however, the dealer-intermediated mi-
crostructure that characterizes these markets has bestowed upon OTC
derivatives dealers a distinct informational advantage-especially in terms
of pricing and deal flow-vis-a-vis their clients, other market participants,
and regulators.
The defining feature of this microstructure is the fact that dealers per-
form an explicit market-making role: structuring derivatives instruments and
marketing them to clients on the basis that they are willing to take either side
of the transaction.16 These dealers then typically look to eliminate the result-
ing exposures by seeking out and entering into offsetting transactions with
other clients or, in many cases, other OTC derivatives dealers. 16 4 Dealers are
thus central-indeed, essential-to the operation of OTC derivatives mar-
kets: representing not only the primary source of innovation, but also of
market access, information and liquidity.165 This reality is reflected in the
concentration of trading activity within these markets. As of June 2010, for
example, the fourteen largest OTC derivatives dealers (the so-called "G14")
were responsible for approximately 82% of the global swaps market. 16 6 This
microstructure has historically deprived the marketplace of objective and
transparent market-access and pricing mechanisms. To put it bluntly, OTC
derivatives markets bear almost no resemblance to the perfect markets of
conventional financial theory.
The information costs (and information failure) generated by this mi-
crostructure are compounded by, inter alia, the opacity of the LCFIs, hedge
162 See, e.g., DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA Li & THEO LUBKE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
POLICY PERSPECLIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKEL INFRASTRUCTURE 10 (2010), http://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr424.pdf; Over-the- Counter Derivatives Markets
Act of 2009, Hearing Before the H. Fin. Services Comm., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of
Ren6 Stulz, Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics, The Ohio State University); Darrell
Duffie & Henry Hu, Competing/for a Share of Global Derivatives Markets: Trends and Policy
Choices for the United States 3 (Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate Governance.
Working Paper No. 50, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id 1140869; Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Princi-
ples-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 274 (2001).
16 This description is most apt in respect of swaps markets. The circumstance is some-
what more complicated in respect of many securitization markets, where dealers can also per-
form a role more closely resembling that of an underwriter in a traditional securities offering.
Ultimately, the dealer's role will generally hinge on how bespoke the instrument is to the needs
of a particular client or clients.
' See DEUTSCHE BORSE GRoup, THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION
17 (2008), available at http://math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/global-derivatives-market.pdf.
Subject to applicable regulatory constraints, dealers can also engage in so-called "proprietary"
trading for their own account.
16" See Duffie & Hu, supra note 162, at 10.
'" David Mengle, Concentration of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers, ISDA RE-
SEARCH NOTES, no. 4, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Concen-
trationRN 4-10.pdf. Broken down by instrument, the G14 held 82% of the total outstanding
notional amount of interest rate derivatives, 90% of CDS, and 86% of equity derivatives. Id.
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funds and many other counterparties that utilize OTC derivatives;167 the frag-
mentation that many OTC derivatives engender;168 and, in many cases, the
sophisticated technical aspects of the instruments themselves. 169 Further-
more, as amply illustrated by the GFC, the widespread use of OTC deriva-
tives strengthens and expands the intricate web of interconnections within
and between financial markets and institutions. Collectively, these attributes
epitomize the complexity of modem financial markets. They also render
securitization, synthetic ETFs and collateral swaps uniquely illuminating
case studies in terms of both the relationship between complexity and finan-
cial innovation and, ultimately, the regulatory challenges posed by the inter-
action of these powerful market dynamics.
B. Three Case Studies in Complexity and Financial Innovation
Securitization170
The case study that has to this point garnered the most scholarly atten-
tion is undoubtedly securitization.171 As described in Part II, securitization is
a process whereby the cash flows associated with non-liquid assets are
pooled together, restructured and sold as securities. Most structured finance
vehicles are, in effect, a form of credit derivative. 172 The first ABS was is-
sued by the U.S. Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
in 1970.173 This nascent ABS market initially revolved around the issuance
of residential MBS by U.S. government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such
as Ginnie Mae, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),
167 See supra pp. 19-20. Indeed, the fact that the identity of counterparties to OTC deriva-
tives matters cuts against the grain of conventional financial theory.
168 See supra pp. 24-25.
16 It is certainly the case that many OTC derivatives are (at least from an economic per-
spective) relatively straightforward to understand and use. It would take a small upfront invest-
ment to familiarize oneself with, for example, the basic structure and potential uses of a single
currency interest rate of foreign exchange swap. At the same time however, the derivatives
universe is populated by a diverse array of far from complex instruments. For a comprehensive
description of the technical aspects of many of these instruments, see SATYAJIT DAS, THE
SWAPS AND FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES LIBRARY: PRoDUCES, PRICING, APPLICATIONS AND RISK
MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 2005); RICHARD FLAVELL, SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (2d ed.
2009).
"" Some might object, perhaps justifiably, to the assertion that securitization vehicles
constitute OTC derivatives. Ultimately, however, while there are important economic (and
legal) distinctions between securitization vehicles and other species of derivatives (e.g., swaps,
options, etc.), they do ultimately fall within the generic-if somewhat overbroad-definition
of a derivative as a financial contract the value or expected performance of which is linked to
another, underlying, asset or assets.
... See e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 23; Gorton, supra note 30; Bartlett, supra note 31;
Jackson, supra note 69; Gubler, supra note 84; and Judge, supra note 91.
172 Essentially because the obligations of the issuers of these securities to make periodic
payments to the holders are contingent upon the (non-)performance of the underlying assets
(as measured by their ability to generate the expected cash flows).
'3 SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 46 (2005).
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and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).17 4 Be-
tween 1970 and 2010, annual issuances within this so-called "agency" MBS
market grew from approximately $USD452 million to over $USDI.9 tril-
lion.17 5 As of June 30, 2011, the outstanding amount of U.S. mortgage-re-
lated securities stood at approximately $USD7 trillion.176
Observing this success, private sector financial institutions-primarily
large commercial and investment banks-began structuring and distributing
"private label" ABS in the mid-1980s.177 Notably, the timing of this move
roughly corresponded with the completion of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord
(Basel I). These financial institutions employed the structures developed by
the GSEs in connection with residential mortgages and quickly adapted them
to securitize cash flows derived from a far broader range of underlying as-
sets including, inter alia: commercial mortgages; home equity and student
loans; automobile, aircraft and equipment leases; credit card receivables;
corporate debt; swaps; and even other securitizations.178 Between 1985 and
2011, the outstanding amount of non-mortgage-related ABS issued in the
U.S. and Europe grew over 1800%-from an estimated $USDI.2 billion to
over $USD2.2 trillion.179
The emergence and precipitous growth of both agency and private label
securitization markets-to say nothing of the markets for CDOs and CDO-
squared-are attributable to a complex bundle of supply-side, demand-side,
and other incentives. The agency ABS market, for example, grew at least in
part out of a desire on the part of the U.S. federal government to expand
home ownership, essentially as a means of ameliorating rising economic me-
quality."') Investors, meanwhile, flocked to ABS, CDOs, and other securi-
tizations in search of both (1) higher yields'' and (2) diversified exposure to,
inter alia, the U.S. residential and commercial property sectors.' 82 Ulti-
mately, however, much of this growth is attributable to the supply-side in-
174 Prohibited by law from originating mortgages, the GSEs would acquire mortgages
from private lenders, securitize them, and then guarantee the income streams generated by the
resulting MBS. Id. at 47.
17 U.S. Mortgage-Related Securities Issuance, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKr Assoc
(SIFMA), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/statistics/statisticsfiles/sf-us-mortgage-
related-issuance-sifma.xls (last visited June 13, 2011).
17 U.S. Mortgage-Related Securities Outstanding, Src. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT Assoc
(SIFMA), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/statistics/statisticsfiles/sf-us-mort-
gage-related-outstanding-sifma.xls (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
17 SIFMA, supra note 175; HEFFERNAN, supra note 173, at 47.
as See U.S. Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT Assoc
(SIFMA), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/statistics/statisticsfiles/sf-us-abs-
sifma.xls (last visited July 5, 2011).
19 id.; Europe Structured Finance Outstanding, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKr Assoc
(SIFMA), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/statistics/statisticsfiles/sf-europe-out-
standing-addendum-data-tables-eur-afme-sifma.xls (last visited May 25, 2011).
"" See RAGHURAM RAJAN, FAUiLT LINES: How HIDDEN FRACTURES STi I, THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONoMY 34-45 (2010); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY ComM'N, supra note 6, at 38-42.
... See Turner, supra note 129.
182 See FIN. CRisis INQUIRY CoMM'N, supra note 6, at 43.
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centives of the commercial and investment banks, which structured and sold
these securities. As a preliminary matter, financial institutions sponsoring
securitized offerings earned sizable fees in connection with these transac-
tions. What is more, securitization enabled originators to shift the market,
liquidity, interest rate, and other risks associated with the underlying assets
off their balance sheets. Most importantly, however, securitization enabled
banks to secure relief from capital adequacy requirements,"' thus freeing up
capital for reinvestment. 18 4 Viewed in this light, the supply-side incentives
come front and centre: the more assets a bank could repackage and sell via
securitization, the more capital it could deploy toward new investments, and
the more assets it would have to fuel the securitization machine. Introduce
CDOs and CDO-squared into this mix-and thus the ability to make new
assets out of thin air-and it is little wonder that securitization markets wit-
nessed such exponential growth in the decades leading up to the GFC.
The complexity generated by the constant stream of new innovation
within ABS, CDO, and other securitization markets is well documented. As
both Gorton and Coval et. al. observe, many of the most (ostensibly) sophis-
ticated institutional investors failed to fully grasp the complex technical as-
pects of both mortgage-backed ABS and the more complex CDOs into
which they were repackaged.' Along the same vein, the structure of many
of these instruments undermined the ability of both underwriters and inves-
tors to effectively screen for and monitor asset and creditor quality."' These
informational problems became more acute with each successive fragmenta-
tion node.18 7 Ultimately, these factors combined to obscure from view the
enormous risks building within this market.
Synthetic ETFs
A second (and considerably less notorious) case study illustrating the
relationship between complexity and financial innovation is the burgeoning
market for synthetic ETFs. ETFs are exchange-traded investment funds de-
' While a detailed examination of capital adequacy requirements is well beyond the
scope of this paper, these requirements-and specifically those articulated under Basel I, II,
and III-prescribe, inter alia, that banks and certain other classes of financial institution main-
tain a specified ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Insofar as many securitization vehicles
attract a lower risk weighting than the underlying assets under these requirements, financial
institutions will ceteris paribus be required to hold a lower amount of capital and, accordingly,
will be incentivized to repackage and sell these assets via securitization.
1' See Viral Acharya, Phillipp Schnabel & Gustavo Suarez, Securitization Without Risk
TransJr, FED. RESERVE BANK OF RicUmoNo (Aug. 2011), http://www.richmondfed.org/con-
ferences and events/research/2009/pdf/suarez paper.pdf; FIN. CRIsis INQuIRY COMM'N, PRE-
LIMINARY STAFF REPORT: OVERVIEW ON DERIVATIVES 6 (June 29, 2010), http://fcic-
static.1aw.stanford.edulcdn-medialfcic-reports/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf; Alan
Greenspan, The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF N.Y. EcoN. Poi 'y REV. 163, 165-66 (1998).
' See Gorton, supra note 30, at 20-34; Coval et. al., supra note 62.
1S6 See Gorton, supra note 30, at 45, 59; Jackson supra note 69.
1' See Judge, supra note 91, at 3.
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signed to replicate the value of a portfolio of assets (e.g. the FTSE, S&P
500, or MSCI Emerging Markets Index).'" ETFs are generally regarded as
low cost and liquid vehicles for investors seeking portfolio diversification.1 9
Their economic rationale is thus very much grounded in MPT. Introduced in
the early 19 9 0 s, plain vanilla ETFs physically replicate the reference portfo-
lio by purchasing the underlying assets.'9 Synthetic ETFs, in contrast, are a
more recent innovation designed to replicate the reference portfolio through
the use of OTC derivatives.191
While there exist a number of ways to structure a synthetic ETF, per-
haps the most common technique involves the sponsor of the fund entering
into a total return swap 92 with a financial intermediary. 93 There are two
components-or "legs"-of this swap. In the first leg, the ETF sponsor con-
tracts with the financial intermediary to receive the total return on the refer-
ence portfolio in exchange for cash equal to the notional amount of the
swap.194 In return, the financial intermediary transfers a portfolio of collat-
eral to the ETF sponsor. Importantly, the collateral assets are often unrelated
to those that the synthetic ETF has been designed to replicate. 95 The second
ISS The investment firm BlackRock estimates that there are now in excess of 2,700 ETFs
worldwide, replicating various portfolios of public equity and debt securities, across virtually
every conceivable investment style, country and region. See Exchange-traded Funds: Too
Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMISI (June 25, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/
node/I 8864254.
' See INT'L MONETARY FUNI, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORI-DURABLE FINAN-
CIAL STABILITY: GETTING THERY FROM HERE 68 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/01/index.htm; FIN. SABILrry BD., POTENIAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
Issons ARISING FROM RECENT TRENDS IN EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFs) 1 (Apr. 12,
2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412b.pdf; BANK
OF ENG., RECORD OF THE INTERIM FINANCIAl PoeICY COMMITTEE MEETING OF JUNE 16, 2011
8 (June 24, 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/records/fpc/pdf/
2011/record I 106.pdf.
""0 See Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange-
Traded Funds 1, (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 343, 2011), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/work343.pdf.
... See id. at 8; FIN STABILITY BD., supra note 189, at 2.
192 A prototypical total return swap (or TRS) involves swapping cash flows calculated
with reference to a floating rate of interest for those derived from the total return (i.e., all
capital gains and interest and dividend income) on a given asset or portfolio of assets. See
Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 5.
1' This structure is commonly referred to as the "unfunded swap structure." Id. This is in
contrast to the "funded swap structure," which, in a nutshell, involves the ETF sponsor buying
a structured note secured by a collateral pledge from a financial intermediary. Notably, in the
funded swap structure, the financial intermediary posts eligible collateral into a ring-fenced
custodial account. Accordingly, unlike the unfunded swap structure, the ETF sponsor is not the
beneficial owner of the collateral assets. See id. at 6 for further details.
1 See id. This has the benefit of transferring the tracking risk in the reference portfolio to
the swap counterparty.
'9 See id. at 5; Too Much oJ a Good Thing, supra note 188. For ETFs domiciled in the
E.U., for example, the Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferrable Securities
(UCITS) Directive 88/220/EEC (as amended) only prescribes that the collateral assets be se-
lected from among certain prescribed classes of equity or debt securities. See Coucil Directive
88/220, arts. 22-23, 1988 O.J. (L100) 31, 32 (ED); FIN. STABILrry BD., supra note 189, at 4.
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leg of the swap then involves the transfer of the total return on the collateral
package back to the financial intermediary.1 6
Synthetic ETFs have thus far proven especially popular in Europe and
Asia.197 The growing demand for these derivatives has been stoked by insti-
tutional investors in search of higher returns in less liquid fixed income and
emerging markets where physical replication of the reference portfolio
would almost certainly prove prohibitively expensive. 98 At least some of the
impetus for the development of synthetic ETFs, however, stems from the
desire on the part of the financial intermediaries acting as swap counterpar-
ties to remove less liquid collateral from their balance sheets-ultimately
with a view to enhancing their liquidity profile, lowering securities ware-
housing costs, and once again, obtaining relief from regulatory capital re-
quirements.199 In the extreme-and in particular where the financial
intermediary is affiliated with the fund sponsor-synthetic ETFs can thus be
utilized as a "dumping ground"2 00 for lower quality assets.2 0' This in turn
serves to highlight the fact that these instruments expose investors to both
(1) counterparty credit risk in connection with the swap itself and (2) market
and liquidity risk in connection with the swap collateral.2 0(2 Accordingly,
while synthetic ETFs are themselves exchange-traded (and thus highly regu-
lated2 03) instruments, their complexity and risk profile more closely resemble
the OTC derivatives that reside at the core of this increasingly popular in-
vestment fund structure.
The complexity associated with synthetic ETFs stems primarily from
the opacity of the underlying swaps and, more specifically, their collateral
packages. This opacity is illustrated by a recent exercise conducted by the
BIS involving a widely traded synthetic ETF replicating the MSCI Emerging
Markets Index.204 With the assistance of the fund sponsor, the BIS was able
196 See Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 5.
' See FIN. SIABILIoY BD., supra note 189, at 3. Synthetic ETFs are less popular in the
U.S. owing to regulatory constraints imposed under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a (2012); see INI'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 189, at 68. Notably, in March
2010 the SEC announced that it was conducting a review of the use of derivatives by ETFs.
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Staff Evaluating the Use of Derivatives
by Funds 2010-45 (Mar. 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-45.htm.
'9 See Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 188; Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 1.
These increased costs are attributable to, inter alia, the wider bid-ask spreads typically encoun-
tered within these markets. See Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 4.
19' See Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 1, 8-10; FIN. STABILITY BD., Supra note 189, at 2;
BANK OF ENG., supra note 189, at 8. In effect, synthetic swaps can thus be utilized to perform
the same economic function (i.e., liquidity transformation) as collateral swaps.
20) Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 188.
21 See INTL MONETARY FUND, supra note 189, at 71-72.
202 See id.; Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 8-9. What is more, these risks are likely to be
exacerbated during periods of market turmoil.
203 As previously mentioned, these instruments are subject to the Investment Company
Act in the U.S. and the UCITS Directive in the E.U., along with the rules of the exchange on
which they trade.
21 See Ramaswamy, supra note 190, at 9-10. This fund utilizes the "funded" swap
structure.
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to determine that the collateral package for this fund contained over 1000
securities, consisting largely of Japanese equities and unrated U.S. corporate
bonds. 205 In the end, however, the BIS found that a more detailed breakdown
of the assets in the collateral package was "not readily available"2 06 and that
obtaining this information "would be a cumbersome process." 2 07 It is also
worth noting that the geographic dispersion of the assets within the collateral
package bears little relation to the emerging market portfolio the fund is
designed to replicate. The BIS exercise thus reinforces the concern that in-
vestors in synthetic ETFs may be operating with less than perfect informa-
tion respecting the risks to which they are ultimately exposed.
Collateral swapS208
Our final case study is the emerging market for so-called "collateral
swaps." A collateral swap is essentially a form of secured lending whereby
one counterparty transfers relatively liquid assets to another in exchange for
a pledge of less liquid collateral. 2 09 In a typical collateral swap, a bank hold-
ing a portfolio of ABS or other securitizations will transfer these assets to a
pension fund or insurance company, which, in exchange for a periodic fee,
will deliver a portfolio of more liquid collateral such as high-grade govern-
ment or corporate bonds.21 0 The pension fund or insurer thereby receives a
higher yield on its (ostensibly) safe investments, while the bank obtains ac-
cess to a portfolio of liquid assets which it can then re-pledge to obtain
funding from central banks and other sources which, in the wake of the
GFC, have been less willing to accept ABS and other securitizations as eligi-
ble collateral.211 The development of collateral swaps is thus, in effect, an
innovative response to both the post-crisis funding constraints on banks and
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 As with securitization, there is a very legitimate argument that, despite their name,
collateral swaps should not be categorized as OTC derivatives. Indeed, insofar as these
instruments are structured as long-dated repo contracts, they bear little similarity with more
traditional swaps (i.e., a series of forward agreements).
209 For this reason, these transactions are often referred to within collateral management
circles as "liquidity transfers." In effect, collateral swaps are economically quite similar to a
long-dated repo arrangement.
210) See Jennifer Hughes, Concern Mounts Over Rise of Collateral Swaps, FIN. TiMns (June
30, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4109c9c-a31f-11e0-a9a4-00144feabdcO.html#axzz
1qlGMk8Zz; Izabella Kaminska, The Privatization of Liquidity Ops, FIN. Trmns (December 17,
2010), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/12/17/439851/the-privatisation-of-liquidity-ops/;
Izabella Kaminska, It's Stock Lending Jim, But Not As You Know It, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2010), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/28/386786/its-stock-lending-jim-but-not-as-you-
know-it; Aaron Wollner, Funding Needs Drive Banks to "Borrow" Liquidity ftom Insurers and
Pensions Funds, LIFE & PENSION RISK (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.risk.net/life-and-pension-
risk/news/1814219/funding-drive-banks-borrow- liquidity- insurers-pension -funds.
211 See Hughes, supra note 210.
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the need to satisfy new liquidity requirements soon to be imposed under
Basel 111.212
Collateral swaps contribute to the complexity of modern financial mar-
kets in at least three ways. First, the collateral swap market is extremely
opaque. Nobody knows with any certainty, for example, how big this market
is, who the major players are, or the size of the aggregate exposures. As a
result, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of the
attendant risks.213 Second, given the identity of the counterparties, collateral
swaps seem destined to strengthen the interconnections between banking
markets, on the one hand, and insurance and pension funds, on the other.
Finally, as described above, collateral swaps are a reflexive response to
changes in the post-crisis market and regulatory environment.
Taken together, securitization, synthetic ETFs, and collateral swaps ex-
emplify both the complexity of modern financial markets and the nature and
pace of financial innovation. The salient question thus becomes: what are
the regulatory challenges flowing from the interaction of these ubiquitous
forces?
IV. COMPLEXITY AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION: THE
REGULATORY CHALLENGES
As amply illustrated by our three case studies, complexity and financial
innovation together generate a host of regulatory challenges. Sophisticated
new instruments, derived from esoteric financial theory, structured in ways
that obscure the attendant risks, and traded in opaque dealer-intermediated
markets by opaque financial institutions raise clear investor-protection is-
sues. Paramount among these is the potential for both (1) uninformed
(suboptimal) contracting, 214 and (2) fraud, misconduct, and other opportunis-
tic behavior on the party of financial intermediaries. The potential for subop-
timal contracting in turn raises the prospect of both overinvestment and
excess leverage leading, ultimately, to the build-up of systemic risk.
Simultaneously, opacity and the pace of innovation also render it more
difficult for regulators to effectively police financial markets and-in con-
junction with interconnectedness and fragmentation-to locate and monitor
potential risks. Meanwhile, the vast array of intricate, evolving and often
undetected interconnections within and between markets and institutions-
themselves often the byproducts of financial innovation-foment systemic
212 See id. In effect, the counterparties to collateral swaps are arbitraging differences in the
capital adequacy regimes applicable to banks, on the one hand, and pension funds and insur-
ance companies, on the other.
213 See BANK OF ENG., supra note 189, at 8.
214 As Milton Friedman observed, optimal contracting necessitates that the actions of par-
ties to a transaction are both voluntary and informed. MI TON FRIEDMAN, CAPITAL ISM AND
FREEDOM 13 (1962). Accordingly, where counterparties face high information costs, asymme-
tries of information and the resulting agency costs problems, there is reason to question the
private (and social) optimality of the contracts into which they enter.
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fragility and manifest the potential to become channels for the transmission
of contagion during periods of market distress.215 Reflexivity contributes still
further to this fragility insofar as its self-reinforcing feedback effects drive
the formation of asset bubbles.216
Financial innovation itself represents yet another source of systemic
vulnerability. Newer, less liquid, and highly concentrated markets frequently
lack the legal, operational, or risk-management infrastructure necessary to
withstand financial shocks. 217 Compounding matters, the appropriability of
financial innovation dilutes the incentives of market participants to invest in
the development of such infrastructure. 218 In the end, financial regulators
face the decidedly daunting prospect of mounting effective responses to
these (and other) challenges as, all the while, the forces of regulatory arbi-
trage-often in the guise of financial innovation-shift the ground beneath
their feet.
Lurking in the background is one final regulatory challenge: welfare
indeterminacy. Regulators cannot directly observe the preferences of their
constituents, nor do they have any practical means of aggregating these pref-
erences into a social welfare function. 219 Simultaneously, they possess im-
perfect knowledge of (exogenous) future events and the (endogenous)
welfare consequences of their policy choices. 2 () These blind spots limit the
ability of regulators to evaluate the net welfare effects of, inter alia, (1)
215 Essentially, these interconnections exacerbate informational problems during periods
of market distress as financial institutions seek to determine the sources and scope of their
potential exposures. Where the informational costs are too great, the resulting uncertainty can
lead to panic and the mass withdrawal of liquidity from the financial system. See, e.g.,
Schwarcz, supra note 23; Gorton, supra note 30; Caballero & Simsek, stpra note 84. What is
more, these interconnections may result in the transmission of financial shocks faster than
regulators are able to address them. See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 215 (citing W. Brian
Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, SCIENCE (Apr. 2, 1999), http://www.sciencemag.org/
content/284/5411/107.full).
216 See SoRos, supra note 109, at 23.
217 See Gubler, supra note 84, at 15.
218 See Hu, supra note 29, at 1482. Indeed, such under-investment is part of a broader
issue stemming from the fact that financial stability is, in effect, a public good.
219 Indeed, many critics of welfare economics have gone so far as to suggest that the
concept of social welfare is both logically incoherent and inherently contested. For an over-
view of these objections, see TIMOiHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLILICAL EcON-
OMY OF GOO GOVERNMEN 21-23 (2006). Perhaps most notably, the assumption that the
aggregation of individual utilities or preferences into a social welfare function is in fact possi-
ble has been challenged by Kenneth Arrow. See generally Kenneth Arrow, A Difficulty in the
Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. EcON. 328 (1950). Arrow argued that the task of aggre-
gating individual preferences is "plagued by the difficulties of interpersonal comparison." Id.
at 329. Under certain specified conditions, Arrow illustrated that a rational paradox could
result from the aggregation of the preferences of as few as two individuals faced with as few as
three potential states, thus precluding the construction of a social welfare function. For a dis-
cussion of the unrealistic nature of many of the assumptions underpinning Arrow's analysis,
see Awrey, stpra note 13, at n.52.
20) Indeed, we do not even know with certainty which future events are exogenous and
which are endogenous. Furthermore, even if we could determine the net welfare effects of a
given policy choice at a particular moment in time, there is no guarantee that it would be
representative of the net effects at any other moment.
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existing financial institutions, instruments and markets; (2) existing regula-
tion; (3) financial innovation; or (4) contemplated regulatory intervention. It
is impossible to know with any real certainty, for example, whether the net
social costs of taxpayer-funded bailouts for the financial institutions at the
epicenter of the GFC exceed those which would have resulted from the eco-
nomic turmoil that these bailouts likely averted; 2 1 whether the systemic ben-
efits flowing from the implementation of the Basel III capital adequacy
framework will outweigh any attendant costs in terms of lost economic
growth, 22 or whether the benefits of OTC derivatives stemming from more
complete markets, enhanced price discovery, and improved market liquidity
exceed the costs arising from inefficient contracting, opportunistic behavior
and potential systemic risks. What is certain, however, is that this welfare
indeterminacy represents a significant regulatory challenge.
The common theme running through this inventory of regulatory chal-
lenges is the existence of pervasive, acute, and often deeply entrenched
asymmetries of information and expertise within modern financial markets.
These twin asymmetries-exacerbated, if not always caused, by complexity
and financial innovation-can be observed both within the marketplace it-
self and, importantly, between market participants and regulators. These
asymmetries have combined to make the entire financial system increasingly
reliant on a relatively small oligopoly of intermediaries which serve as the
repositories and purveyors of this information and expertise. As made all too
clear by the economic turmoil unleashed by the GFC, the nature and extent
of this reliance has generated what can fairly be described as the mother of
all agency cost problems.
V. OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF THE GFC: A
BRAVE NEW WORLD
Prior to the GFC, the approach adopted toward OTC derivatives regula-
tion in jurisdictions such as the U.S. and U.K.-which account for the vast
221 Although this has not stopped scholars from attempting to quantify these costs. See
Pietro Veronesi & Luigi Zingales, Paulson's Gift (Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper
No. 09-42, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1498548.
222 Although, once again, this has not stopped various observers from attempting to quan-
tify these costs. See e.g., Patrick Slovik & Boris Cournbde, Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III
(OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 844, 2011), available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/macroeconomic-impact-of-basel-iii_5kghwnhkkjs8-en; Douglas Elliott,
Basel III, the Banks, and the Economy, THE BROOKINGS INSI. (July 23, 2010), http://
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0726_basel-elliott/0726_basel-elliott.pdf;
THE INST. OF INT'L FIN., INTERIM CUMULAIVE EFFECi REPORI (June 2010), available at http://
www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/10-Interim%20NCIJune2010 Web.pdf; Douglas Elliott, Quanti fing
the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements, THE BROOKINGS INSI. (Sept. 21,
2009), http://www.brookings.edu//media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0924_capital-elliott/
0924_capital-elliott.pdf.
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majority of global trading activity 2 3-can perhaps best be described as
"non-interventionist." 2 4 Swaps markets effectively (if not at all times le-
gally) fell outside the perimeter of securities and futures regulation in both
jurisdictions. 25 ABS, CDOs, and other securitizations, meanwhile, were fre-
quently offered under exemptions from the prospectus, registration, and
other requirements imposed under applicable securities laws. 26 This non-
interventionist approach was shaped by the prevailing free market ideology
which viewed market participants as invariably best positioned to address
the risks arising in connection with OTC derivatives. 2 7 It was also influ-
enced by mounting competitive pressures within the increasingly global
223 As of April 2010, for example, these two jurisdictions accounted for roughly 70% of
global turnover in OTC interest rate derivatives and 55% of the global turnover in OTC foreign
exchange derivatives. BANK FOR INT'r SETTIEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS ACTIvIY IN APRII 2010 -PREL IMINARY RE-
suiTs 5-6 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxlO.pdf. Other jurisdictions
with a meaningful share of global turnover in these instruments include Japan (6% of OTC
foreign exchange derivatives and 3% of OTC interest rate derivatives), Singapore (5% and
3%) and Switzerland (5% and 3%). Id. While reliable comparable data for equity, credit and
commodity -linked derivatives is more difficult to come by, the available data suggests a simi-
lar (if not greater) degree of geographic concentration within these market segments. See Duf-
fie & Hu, supra note 162, at 12-16.
224 A handful of observers have suggested that, despite appearances, the U.S. Federal Re-
serve Board and other federal banking regulators actually played a robust oversight role in
respect of OTC derivatives. See, e.g., Scm Yi.ER HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES
(2d ed. 2010). Ultimately, however, these observers downplay (or altogether ignore) the myr-
iad of ways in which these regulators systematically relaxed the regulatory rules surrounding
these instruments in the decades leading up to the GFC. For a survey of these actions, see
Awrey, supra note 103; Saule Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed
the "Business of Banking, " 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009); Saule Omarova, From Gramm-
Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfilfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011). More fundamentally, these observers seemingly fail to
appreciate the rather obvious point that U.S. banking regulators do not enjoy jurisdiction over
global markets.
225 See Awrey, supra note 103, for a detailed description of the pre-crisis regulatory treat-
ment of swaps in both the U.S. and U.K.
226 In the U.S., for example, exemptions could be obtained under sections 3(a)(2) and 4(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-3(a)(2), 77a-4(2) (2012), and sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7)
(2012). Very briefly, Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an exemption for
securities issued by federally regulated banks and savings and loan associations. § 77a-3(a)(2).
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an exemption for transactions not involving
a public offering of securities. § 77a-4(2). Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of
1940 provides an exemption where the beneficial holders of outstanding securities number less
than 100 at any time. § 80a-3(c)(1). Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
meanwhile, provides an exemption where the issuer does not make a public offering and the
securities are owned by certain qualified purchasers (i.e. those meeting a prescribed income or
asset test). § 80a-3(c)(1). The SEC would subsequently expand the available exemptions
through the promulgation of Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933 (adopted in 1990)
and Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (adopted in 1992).
227 The influence of this ideology is most clearly visible in connection with the Congres-
sional hearings leading up to the enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), which, inter alia, prohibited federal securi-
ties and futures regulators from regulating OTC derivatives markets. See Greenspan, The Reg-
ulation of OTC Derivatives, supra note 12.
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market for investment banking services. 2 8 Ultimately, however, this ap-
proach effectively disregarded the risks and regulatory challenges generated
by complexity and financial innovation. The $USD700 trillion dollar ques-
tion thus becomes: what lessons, if any, have policymakers taken away from
the GFC?
The frenzied and destructive events of March-September 2008 spurred
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to fundamentally reevaluate their
approaches toward the regulation of OTC derivatives markets.2 29 This "re-
think" was motivated by two principal observations. First, when the chips
were down, the size, technological sophistication, opacity, interconnected-
ness, and fragmentation of OTC derivatives markets-in short, their com-
plexity-meant that nobody knew with any certainty where or how big the
counterparty credit (and thus systemic) risks were. Second, bilateral risk
management-i.e. privately negotiated collateral and netting arrange-
ments-had not effectively mitigated these risks. Manmohan Singh, for ex-
ample, has estimated that as of 2008 bilateral swap markets were under-
collateralized by as much as $USD2 trillion.23() Perhaps most importantly,
prevailing market practice dictated that intra-dealer exposures were often
entirely uncollateralized. 21
On March 4, 2009, the European Commission announced its commit-
ment to implement reforms designed to increase transparency and reduce
systemic risk within OTC derivatives markets.232 This commitment would
eventually be met in the form of the E.U. Regulation on OTC Derivatives,
228 See Duffie & Hu, supra note 162, at 12-16; McKINSEY & Co., supra note 96.
229 This shift began (modestly enough) in March 2008-in the immediate aftermath of the
Bear Stearns bailout-when the CFTC and SEC entered into a mutual cooperation agreement
with a view to enhancing coordination and facilitating the review of new derivatives instru-
ments. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC, SEC Sign Agreement
to Enhance Coordination, Facilitate Review of New Derivatives Products (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-40.htm. Then, in November, the CFTC, SEC, and
Federal Reserve Board entered into a memorandum of understanding to establish a framework
for consultation and information sharing on regulatory issues related to central counterparties
for CDS contracts. See History of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMN,
www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history _2000s.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
Shortly thereafter, the CFTC announced that the CME had certified a proposal to clear CDS
through the CME's clearing facilities. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
CFTC Announces that CME Has Certified a Proposal to Clear Credit Default Swaps (Dec. 23,
2008), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5592-08.
2" As measured by derivatives payables. Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Sys-
temic Risk within OTC Derivatives Markets (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 10/99,
2010). See also Manmohan Singh and James Aitken, Counterparty Risk, Impact on Collateral
Flows and Role for Central Counterparties (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 09/173,
2009); Miguel Segoviano Basurto and Manmohan Singh, Counterparty Risk in the Over-The-
Counter Derivatives Market (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 08/258, 2008).
231 See Singh, supra note 230, at 7.
232 See Driving European Recovery, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 4, 2009), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri COM:2009:0114:FIN:EN:PDF. See also En-
suring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets: Future Policy Actions, EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION (October 20, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri COM:
2009:0563:FIN:EN:PDF.
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Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (or EMIR233), adopted on Sep-
tember 15, 2010.234 The U.S. Treasury Department, meanwhile, was also ea-
ger to signal its enthusiasm for a new approach: unveiling the draft Over-
the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act in August 2009.235 These reforms
would ultimately be enacted in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.2 36
A. The U.S. Regulatory Response
The Obama Administration has characterized the objectives of the new
U.S. regime as to: (1) guard against the build-up of systemic risk; (2) pro-
mote transparency and efficiency; (3) thwart market manipulation, fraud, in-
sider trading and other abuse; and (4) prevent inappropriate marketing to
unsophisticated counterparties.237 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act employs
four primary mechanisms in pursuit of these objectives. 238 First, it confers
upon the CFTC and SEC the authority to mandate that financial instruments
falling within the definition of either a "swap" or "security-based swap" 239
be centrally cleared through CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing organiza-
tions or SEC-regulated securities clearing agencies (collectively, CCPs). 240
233 Which stands for the 'European Market Infrastructure Directive'.
234 EMIR is not scheduled to come into full force and effect until December 31, 2012. The
U.K. is obligated under E.U. law to implement EMIR. ELR. PAiL. Doc. (COM 0484) (2010).
235 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Administration's Regulatory Reform
Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol
Hill (Aug. 11, 2009), which includes the proposed text of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Markets Act of 2009.
26 While Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act (governing OTC derivatives) technically came
into force on July 16, 2011, the effective date of the vast majority of the contemplated reforms
has been delayed pending the completion of the requisite rulemaking process. Each of these
reforms will take effect 60 days following the publication of the relevant final rule. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 754, 24 Stat.
1376 (2010).
237 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 235.
23 Not including (1) the "push out" of (most) derivatives activities conducted by feder-
ally insured banks to separate non-bank affiliates, see Dodd-Frank Act § 716, or (2) the so-
called "Volcker Rule" limiting the proprietary trading activities of bank holding companies.
See id. § 619.
23 Taken together, the definitions of swap and security-based swap encompass the vast
majority of OTC derivatives instruments. See id. §§ 721, 761. That said, the dividing line
between swaps and security-based swaps is not altogether clear under the Dodd-Frank Act,
especially with respect to swaps based on a portfolio of assets, such as those which often form
the subject matter of structured finance transactions.
2411 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent refer-
ences to "swap" shall, for the purposes of this description of the operative provisions of Title
Vll of the Dodd-Frank Act, be construed so as to include a "security-based swap." The pro-
cess for determining whether a particular group, category, type, or class of swap be will sub-
ject to the central clearing and exchange-trading requirements can be initiated by either a CCP
or the relevant regulator. See id. § 723(a)(3). CCPs are required to submit to the CFTC or
SEC, as applicable, "any group, category, type, or class of [security-based] swap" it intends
to accept for clearing and provide notice of this submission to its members. Id. In reviewing a
submission, the CFTC or SEC will determine whether the submission is consistent with the
core principles of the relevant CCP. Id. The relevant regulator is also required to take into
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In very broad terms, CCPs interpose themselves between the counterparties
to bilateral OTC transactions, effectively assuming the obligations of each
party to the other.2 41 The principle advantage of centralized clearing and set-
tlement through CCPs is the potential mitigation of both counterparty credit
and systemic risk via the (1) multilateral netting of exposures,2 42 (2) collater-
alization of residual net exposures, 243 (3) enforcement of robust risk manage-
ment standards, 244 and (4) mutualization of losses resulting from the failure a
clearing member.2 45 Simultaneously, of course, CCPs concentrate
counterparty credit-and thus systemic-risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act contemplates an exemption from the clearing re-
quirement if one of the counterparties (1) is not a "financial entity," (2) is
using the instrument to "hedge or mitigate commercial risk," and (3) pro-
vides prescribed information to the relevant regulator respecting how it
meets its financial obligations in connection with bilaterally cleared
swaps.2 46 For the purposes of this commercial end-user exemption, a finan-
cial entity includes a swap dealer, 247 major swap participant,2 48 and certain
account the following factors: (1) "the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures,
trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data," (2) "the availability of a rule framework, capac-
ity, operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the contract
on terms that are consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which the
contract is then traded," (3) "the effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account
the size of the market for such contract and the resources of the CCP available to clear the
contract," (4) "the effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to
clearing," and (5) "the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of
the relevant CCP or one or more of its clearing members with regard to the treatment of
customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property." Id.
21 See Durrin, Li & LUBKE, supra note 162, at 5. As Duffie and his co-authors explain, a
"CCP stands between two original counterparties as the seller to the original buyer, and as the
buyer to the original seller." Id. See also Guidance on the Application of the 2004 CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties to OTC Derivatives CCPs, BANK FOR
INT'I, SETTLEMENTS & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'I, ORG. OF SEC. COMMN I (May 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss89.htm.
242 Multilateral netting involves eliminating offsetting or redundant positions via, inter
alia, the utilization of portfolio compression or so-called "tear up" procedures.
24 Effectively creating a first loss position that serves as a capital buffer in the event of
counterparty default.
24 By prescribing rules respecting, for example, capital, initial and variation margin, col-
lateral, position portability, segregation of client assets, and stress testing.
245 See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABLITY REPORT: MEETING NEW CHAT IENGES TO STABILITY
AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM, INTL MONETARY FUND 97 (Apr. 2010), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/201 0/01/index.htm; NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN CLEARING AND
SE1 ILEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES, BANK FOR INT'L SETILEMENTS (COmm.
on Payment and Settlement Systems, Publ'n No. 77 2007), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cpss77.htm.
246 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 723(a)(3), 24 Stat. 1376 (2010). The non-financial or hedging counterparty retains the option
to require that the instrument be centrally cleared. Id.
247 Section 721(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act and section 3(a)(71) of the Exchange Act define
a swap dealer as: "any person who-(i) holds itself out as a dealer in [security-based] swaps;
(ii) makes a market in [security-based] swaps; (iii) regularly enters into [security-based]
swaps . . . ; or (iv) engages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the
trade as a dealer or market maker in [security-based] swaps." Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a). This
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other identified classes of financial institution. 249 In order to incentivize
greater utilization of centrally-cleared derivatives, it is likely that the new
regime will ultimately impose higher capital and margin requirements on
both swap dealers and major swap participants in connection with bilaterally
cleared swaps.25 01
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act gives regulators the authority to require
that any swap subject to the clearing requirement also trade on a regulated
board of trade, exchange, or alternative swap execution facility.25' This exe-
cution requirement will not apply, however, where (1) no board of trade,
exchange, or swap execution facility makes the swap available to trade or (2)
one of the counterparties to the swap falls within the commercial end-user
exemption to the clearing requirement. 25 2 Where swaps are subject to this
execution requirement, the expectation is that this will enhance price discov-
ery, promote greater market transparency and curb opportunities for market
abuse.
Third, the Dodd-Frank Act requires all swap dealers, 253 major swap par-
ticipants,25 4 CCPs,2 55 swap execution facilities, 25 6 and swap data repositories
(SDRs)257 to register with the SEC, CFTC, or federal banking regulators.
definition does not include a person who enters into swaps for their own account (or in a
fiduciary capacity), but does not do so as part of a regular business. Id.
248 Section 721(a) and 761(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act define a major swap participant as:
"any person who is not a [security-based] swap dealer and-(i) maintains a substantial [net]
position in swaps for any of the major swap categories as determined by the [relevant regula-
tor], excluding (I) positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk . . . (ii) whose
outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse
effects on the financial stability of the United States banking system or financial markets."
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 721(a), 761(a). The definition also includes a financial institution falling
under the definition of financial entity as set out in the Dodd-Frank Act that is (1) highly
leveraged, (2) not subject to capital requirements, and (3) maintains a substantial net position
in outstanding swaps for any of the major swap categories as determined by the relevant regu-
lator. Id. The definition of a "substantial position" is left to be defined by the relevant regula-
tors. Id.
249 See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3).
25 See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 235. Ultimately, however, the Dodd-Frank
Act only mandates that the CFTC, SEC, and federal banking regulators, as applicable, set
minimum capital and margin requirements. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 731, 764. See also Margin
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed.
Reg. 23,732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 23); Capital Require-
ments of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,802 (proposed May 12,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23, 140).
251 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 763. Section 721(a) defines a swap execution facility as
"a trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability to execute or
trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility or sys-
tem." Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a).
252 See id. § 721(a).
253 See id. §§ 731, 764.
254 See id.
255 See id. § 725.
256 See id. §§ 733, 763.
257 See id. §§ 728, 763. An SDR is a centralized registry that maintains a database of
transaction records. SDRs may also manage trade life-cycle events and downstream trade
processing services. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 241, at 1.
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Once registered, swap dealers and major swap participants are subject to,
inter alia, capital, margin, reporting, recordkeeping, and business conduct
requirements. 258 CCPs registered with the CFTC, swap execution facilities
and SDRs, meanwhile, are required to (1) comply with a set of "core princi-
ples" and other requirements and (2) design, implement, monitor, and en-
force technical regulation in furtherance of these principles.259 While the
Dodd-Frank Act does not articulate a similar set of core principles for CCPs
registered with the SEC, it does mandate that the two agencies adopt consis-
tent and comparable rules governing these registrants. 26 0
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes extensive recordkeeping and re-
porting requirements on these new registrants. Swap counterparties are re-
quired to report all centrally and bilaterally cleared swaps to an SDR.261
SDRs, CCPs and swap execution facilities are then obligated to provide
granular counterparty and transaction information to the relevant regula-
tors.262 These regulators are, in turn, required to publically disseminate
anonymized transaction and pricing data on a "real time" basis. 263 This pub-
lic reporting requirement is explicitly designed to enhance price discovery. 26 4
More broadly, these requirements are designed to leverage the centralization
of transaction data within SDRs, CCPs, swap execution facilities and other
institutions with a view to generating greater market transparency and, as a
consequence, enabling regulators to more effectively monitor the location,
nature and extent of potential systemic risks.265
The Dodd-Frank Act carves up jurisdiction over bilateral OTC deriva-
tives on the basis of a distinction between (1) contracts for the sale of a
commodity for future delivery and swaps (subject to CFTC jurisdiction) and
(2) security-based swaps (subject to SEC jurisdiction).2 66 Simultaneously,
however, it mandates consistency and comparability between SEC and
CFTC rules and regulations governing functionally or economically similar
258 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 731, 764. The capital and margin requirements will only apply
in respect of bilaterally cleared swaps. The corresponding requirements for centrally cleared
swaps will be set by the relevant CCP. See id. Section 737 also contemplates that the CFTC
may set position limits (excluding bona fide hedges) for swaps that perform or affect a signifi-
cant price discovery function with respect to registered entities. See id. § 737. See also Position
Limits for Derivatives, 76 Fed. Reg. 4752 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 50, 51).
259 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 725, 728, 733, 763.
261) See id. § 712(a)(7).
261 See id. §§ 727, 729, 766. These provisions set out rules respecting which counterparty
is required to report the swap. In the circumstance where no SDR will accept the swap, it must
be reported directly to the relevant regulator. See id. §§ 729, 766. Notably, this reporting obli-
gation also applies to swaps entered into prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. See id.
262 See id. §§ 725, 728, 733.
263 See id. § 727. For the purpose of these requirements, reporting on a "real time" basis
refers to reporting within a time frame that is "technologically practicable." Id.
264 See id.
265 See INTl MONETARY FUND, supra note 253 at 105-06.
266 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 712, 722, 761-63.
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products and registrants.2 67 To this end, the SEC and CFTC have been
handed joint responsibility for fleshing out the innumerable technical details
of the new regime. 268 The two agencies are thus currently engaged in the
monumental task of issuing proposed and final rules respecting, inter alia,
the process by which regulators determine whether a swap will be subject to
the clearing requirement; 26 9 risk management and business conduct standards
for CCPs, SDRs, swap dealers and major swap participants; 270 margin and
capital requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants, and own-
ership limitations and governance requirements for CCPs, designated con-
tract markets, exchanges and swap execution facilities.2'
The Dodd-Frank Act also seeks to enhance the regulation of ABS and
other securitizations-including, importantly, those offered under exemp-
tions from the prospectus and registration requirements under the Securities
Act.272 First, it requires issuers of ABS and other securitizations to disclose
267 See id. § 712(a).
268 See id. § 712(d)(1). Including the definitions of swap, security-based swap, swap
dealer, security-based swap dealer, major swap participant, major security-based swap partici-
pant, and eligible contract participant. See id. The Obama Administration has requested and
received a joint plan for harmonizing the regulation of OTC derivatives markets. See Joint
Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation, CoMMoDITY FUTUREs
TRADING COMMN AND SEC. AND ExcH. ComM'N (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/opacftc-secfinaljointreport 101 .pdf.
269 See Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,464 (July
26, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 140); Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and
Form 19b-4 Applicable to All Self-Regulatory Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,490 (proposed
Dec. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
2711 See, e.g., Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles,
76 Fed. Reg. 69,334 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140); Informa-
tion Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,185
(proposed Dec. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39); Business Conduct Stan-
dards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants With Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638
(proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23, 155); Swap Data Repositories,
75 Fed Reg. 80,898 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 49); Core Princi-
ples and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 1214 (proposed Jan.
7, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 37). See also Security-Based Swap Data Repository
Registration, Duties and Core Principles, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,306 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
240, 242, 249); Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Se-
curity-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (proposed July 18, 2011) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
271 See e.g., Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 722 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 37-40). See also Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and
Governance, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,472 (proposed Mar. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240); Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clear-
ing Agencies, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,645 (Mar. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 242).
272 Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Act introduced section 3(a)(77) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which defines an "asset-backed security" as a fixed income or other
security collateralized by any type of self-liquidating financial asset that allows the holder of
the security to receive payments that depend primarily on the cash flows from that asset. See
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 943, 24
Stat. 1376 (2010). Notably, the definition expressly includes both CDOs and CDO-squared. Id.
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information respecting the quality of the assets backing each tranche or class
of security.273 Where necessary for investors to perform independent due dil-
igence, issuers must also disclose more detailed asset or loan-level data.274
Second, it requires "securitizers"27 5 to disclose fulfilled and unfulfilled re-
purchase requests across all trusts aggregated by the securitizer.276 Third, it
compels credit rating agencies to include information in their rating reports
respecting the representations, warranties, and enforcement mechanisms
available to investors in connection with a securitization and, importantly,
how these provisions differ from other offerings of similar securities.2 77 Fi-
nally, it imposes risk retention requirements on securitizers: mandating that,
in certain prescribed circumstances, 278 they maintain at least 5% of the credit
risk in connection with any assets they sell into a securitization. 279, 28( As with
the new regime governing swaps, the securitization provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act contemplate substantial post-enactment rulemaking. 281
B. The European Regulatory Response
The scope and substantive requirements of the new European regime
are broadly consistent with Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.282 EMIR man-
dates that all "eligible"283 OTC derivatives between "financial counterpar-
273 See Dodd-Frank Act § 942(b). The Dodd-Frank Act then requires the SEC to adopt
regulations prescribing the specific format and content of these disclosures. Id.
274 See id.
275 The Dodd-Frank Act defines a securitizer as (1) an issuer of an ABS or other securi-
tization or (2) a person who organizes and initiates an ABS transaction by selling or transfer-
ring assets, either directly or indirectly, to the issuer. Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b).
276 See id. § 943(2). The Dodd-Frank Act characterizes the objective of this provision as to
make it easier for investors to identify asset originators with clear underwriting deficiencies.
Id. This obligation only applies, however, where the transaction documentation contains a
covenant to repurchase an asset. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required By Sec-
tion 943 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489 (Jan. 26,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 232, 240, 249).
277 See Dodd-Frank Act § 943(1); Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required By
Section 943 of the Wall Street Reform Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4489.
278 Specifically, the risk retention requirements may be reduced where the underwriting
standards employed by the originator indicate that those assets manifest less credit risk. In
addition, these requirements do not apply in respect of ABS collateralized exclusively by cer-
tain "qualified residential mortgages." Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b).
279 See id.
28' These risk retention requirements must also be viewed in conjunction with Basel III,
which, when effective, will impose more conservative capital requirements in respect of some
securitization exposures. For an overview of these requirements, see Tougher Capital Require-
ments Under Basel III Could Raise the Costs ofJSecuritization, SrANDAR & PooR's (Nov. 17,
2010).
281 The OCC, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC and SEC are responsible for promulgating
regulation in respect of the risk retention requirements. The SEC, meanwhile, is responsible
for adopting regulation in respect of the disclosure requirements.
282 Although, as will be explored in greater detail below, there is considerable scope for
substantive divergence.
283 Much like the new U.S. regime, EMIR establishes a process for determining whether
an instrument is eligible for centralized clearing. This process can unfold in one of two ways.
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ties"284 be cleared and settled through a CCP.285 This mandatory clearing
requirement also applies to non-financial counterparties whose derivatives
positions-excluding those objectively linked to the counterparty's commer-
cial activities-exceed a prescribed threshold. 28 6,28 7 Both financial and non-
financial counterparties entering into OTC derivatives not subject to the
mandatory clearing requirement, meanwhile, are required to hold "appropri-
ate and proportionate" 288 capital and ensure that they have put in place ap-
propriate procedures and arrangements to "measure, monitor and mitigate
operational and credit risk." 28 9
EMIR also establishes a uniform authorization requirement for CCPs. 290
While these CCPs will continue to be registered and supervised at the na-
tional level, the Regulation empowers ESMA to develop technical standards
and to ensure the uniform and objective application of these standards across
the E.U.291 To this end, it imposes organizational and conduct of business
The first way is a "bottom-up" process, pursuant to which a CCP applies to the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) for a determination. European Market Infrastructure
Regulation, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 4(1) (2010). The second "top-down" process in-
volves ESMA, in conjunction with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), determining
that a contract should be subject to the mandatory clearing requirement. EuR. PARL. Doc.
(COM 0484) 4(5) (2010).
284 A financial counterparty is defined as including a bank, investment bank, insurance
company,; UCITS fund,pension fund, or alternative investment fund manager. EUR. PART.
Doc. (COM 0484) 2(6) (2010).
285 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 3 (2010).
286 There are actually two thresholds: an information threshold and a clearing threshold.
Non-financial counterparties exceeding the information threshold are required to report the
details of any OTC derivatives instrument to a trade repository. See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM
0484) 6(1), 7(1) (2010). Non-financial counterparties exceeding the clearing threshold are sub-
ject to the mandatory clearing requirement. See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 6(1), 7(1)
(2010). Instruments that are objectively ascertained to be linked to a non-financial
counterparty's commercial activities will not be taken into account in determining whether the
counterparty has exceeded the clearing threshold. See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 3(4)
(2010). ESMA and the ESRB have been handed primary responsibility for articulating the
substance of both thresholds no later than June 30, 2012. See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484)
7(3) (2010).
287 It is not clear on the face of this provision how transactions between a financial and
non-financial counterparty not exceeding either the information or clearing tests would be
treated. If EMIR is to be consistent with Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, such
transactions should be exempt.
28 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 8(l) (2010). The European Commission is empowered
under EMIR to adopt technical regulation specifying the amount of capital necessary to com-
ply with art. 8(l). See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 8(2) (2010).
289 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 8(2) (2010).
29
0 See EuR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 10 (2010). CCPs, derivatives exchanges and alter-
native execution facilities are already subject to E.U. regulation under MiFID. The E.U. has
launched a consultation that is seeking to, inter alia, determine how MiFID should be updated
to reflect emerging trends in this area. See Press Release, Eur. Union, Financial Services:
Improving European Rules for a More Robust Framework for All Financial Actors and Instru-
ments (Dec. 8, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1677&
format HTML&aged= 0&language EN&guiLanguage EN.
291 See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) (2010) ("Explanatory Memorandum").
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requirements on CCPs respecting, inter alia, initial capital;2 92 governance; 293
ownership; 294 access ;295 transparency;2 96 outsourcing;2 97 segregation;2 98 posi-
tion portability;299 and interoperability.soo It also imposes prudential require-
ments respecting, inter alia, margin and collateral mechanisms;""n permitted
investments;302 default waterfalls, funds, and other procedures;"" and risk
modeling, stress testing, and back testing.3014
Lastly, EMIR requires all "trade repositories""o (TRs) to register with
ESMA.o 6 It then subjects this new class of registrants to organizational and
operational requirements respecting, inter alia, governance;307 access;3)8 in-
formation safeguarding;o' transparency;""a and data availability. 1' Financial
counterparties, along with non-financial counterparties whose derivatives
positions exceed a prescribed information threshold, are required to report
292 All CCPs are required to have permanent, available, and separate capital of at least
EUR 5 million. EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 12(1) (2010).
293 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 24-26, 31 (2010). These governance requirements con-
template, among many other matters: (1) clear separation between the reporting lines for risk
management and other operations, (2) remuneration policies designed to support sound risk
management, (3) frequent and independent audits, and (4) the establishment of an independent
risk committee to advise the board of directors on any arrangements that may impact the risk
management of the CCP.
294 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 28 (2010).
295 See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 35 (2010). Most importantly, CCPs must establish
non-discriminatory, transparent, and objective criteria for ensuring fair and open access to the
CCP.
296 See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 36 (2010). Notably, in certain prescribed circum-
stances, these requirements empower national regulatory authorities to refuse authorization or
"take other appropriate measures" in response to issues surrounding the identity, influence, or
holdings of a CCP's owners.
297 See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 33 (2010).
298 See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 37 (2010).
299 See id.
3o1 See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 48-50 (2010).
3o1 See EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 39, 43 (2010).
302 See EuR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 44 (2010). These requirements are designed to
ensure that a CCP will only invest in highly liquid assets to which it enjoys prompt and non-
discriminatory access.
3o3 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 40, 42, 45 (2010). These requirements prescribe,
inter alia, (1) that a CCP shall maintain a fund to cover losses arising from the default of a
clearing member, (2) the order in which the financial resources of a CCP shall be deployed in
the event of default, and (3) that a CCP shall have in place procedures to be followed in
various default scenarios.
30 See EUR. PAi L. Doc. (COM 0484) 46 (2010). Specifically, a CCP must regularly re-
view its models and parameters and subject its models to rigorous and frequent stress tests to
evaluate their resilience in extreme but plausible market conditions. It must also perform back-
tests to evaluate the reliability of the methodology adopted. The results of these tests must be
reported to the relevant national authority.
3o5 EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 10 (2010). TRs are the E.U. equivalent of SDRs under
the Dodd-Frank Act.
3o6 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 51 (2010).
3o7 See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 64(1)-(4) (2010).
3o1 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 64(5) (2010).
3o1 See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 66 (2010).
311o See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 67 (2010).
311 See id.
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all OTC derivatives transactions to a registered TR.312 TRs are in turn re-
quired to make this information available to both ESMA and the relevant
national authorities and to publicly disclose aggregate derivatives positions
broken down by class."'
C. The Post-Crisis Regulatory Response: A Preliminary Assessment
On the surface, the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR represent a wholesale
shift in terms of the regulation of OTC derivatives markets. But how far do
these reforms go in responding to the risks and regulatory challenges stem-
ming from complexity and financial innovation? On at least one level, these
reforms can be viewed as holding out considerable promise. The Dodd-
Frank Act and EMIR both introduce mechanisms designed to subsidize the
production and dissemination of information for use by both market partici-
pants and regulators. CCPs, for example, can be understood as simplifying
the complex and constantly evolving network of bilateral derivatives expo-
sures-theoretically making it less costly for end-users, dealers, and regula-
tors to evaluate counterparty credit risk in connection with centrally cleared
swaps.314 SDRs and TRs, meanwhile, will serve as important nodes for the
aggregation and dissemination of derivatives trading data in respect of both
centrally and bilaterally cleared instruments."' The enhanced disclosure re-
quirements for ABS and other securitizations under the Dodd-Frank Act are,
similarly, a step in the right direction.
Simultaneously, however, considerable work remains to be done to
shine a more powerful light on some of the murkier corners of the global
financial system. Almost two years after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the Office of Financial Research-the new federal agency charged with
the task of improving the quality of financial information available to U.S.
policymakers-has yet to produce any meaningful research or market
data. 16 More fundamentally, finalizing the legislative frameworks governing
CCPs, SDRs/TRs and other major market participants has been an extremely
31 See EUR. PART. Doc. (COM 0484) 6, 7(1) (2010).
. See ELR. PARL. Doc. (COM 0484) 67 (2010).
314 In effect by transforming a complex 'web' of exposures into a simpler 'hub and spoke'
network. See Gai et. al., supra note 25, at 22-3.
s" Although this will ultimately depend on the type and format (and thus usability) of the
information that must be made available to regulators and the public. For a discussion of the
relevant issues in this regard, see Requirenents fbr OTC derivatives data reporting and aggre-
gation: CPSS-IOSCOpublishes final report, BANK FOR INT'L SE1 ILEMENTS (Jan. 2012), http://
www.bis.org/publ/cpss I 00.pdf.
3 " Having produced only one working paper-a survey of existing quantitative measures
of systemic risk-and no actual financial data as of April 2012. See Dimitrios Bisias, et al., A
Survey of'Systemic Risk Analytics (U.S Dep't of the Treasury Office of Fin. Research, Working
Paper #1, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Documents/OFRwp0
001_BisiasFloodLoValavanisASurveyOfSystemicRiskAnalytics.pdf.
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slow-and often opaque-process in many jurisdictions.317 Indeed, the pro-
jected timeframes for full implementation of these reforms in the U.S., Eu-
rope, and elsewhere (originally slated for December 2012) are now far from
clear. 1 Compounding matters, uneven implementation across jurisdic-
tions-in terms of both timing and substantive content-may actually serve
to increase information costs. 19 While progress has been measurable, we are
thus still some distance from realizing the objective of meaningfully reduc-
ing information costs within OTC derivatives markets and, ultimately, level-
ing the informational playing field.
Moreover, while timely and comprehensive access to information is un-
doubtedly a necessary condition for both optimal private contracting and
effective public oversight, it is by no means sufficient. As soberly illustrated
by the collapse of the U.S. MBS market in 2007-2008,32() the subsequent run
in the repo market at the epicentre of Lehman's demise,321 and Robert Bart-
lett's event study involving the derivatives disclosures of Ambac Financial,3 22
the sheer volume of information available within modem financial mar-
kets-combined with the rapid pace of change-can overwhelm the power-
ful incentives of even the most sophisticated market participants. Regulators,
likewise, have struggled with what is, in effect, information overload. As we
have seen, this dense "information thicket"323 is rendered even more impen-
etrable by other drivers of complexity including, inter alia, technology, in-
terconnectedness, fragmentation, regulation, and reflexivity. Viewed from
this perspective, the marginal benefits of simply generating more informa-
tion may be very limited indeed.
One intuitively appealing potential policy response-especially if we
believe that the complexity of modem financial markets contributes to mar-
ket failure and other socially suboptimal outcomes-is to enhance the re-
sources, incentives and expertise of public regulators.324 Thus, for example,
"I For an overview of the status of these reforms, see Overview of Progress in the Imple-
mentation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, FIN. SrABILIY
BD. 2, 16-18 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r I1 1104gg.
pdf; OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, FIN. SrABILIY BD. (Oct. 11, 2011), http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 111011 b.pdf.
" See Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for
Strengthening Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY BD. 2, 16-18 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 111 104gg.pdf
s19 And, of course, raises the prospect of regulatory arbitrage.
32) See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 ELR. FIN. MGMI. 10 (2009); Gorton, supra
note 30.
321 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Nat'l
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w15223, 2009); GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE
FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE PANIC OF 2007 (2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1401882; Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity
and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007, (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w14649,
2009).
322 See Bartlett, supra note 31.
323 Id.
32 At least insofar as the anticipated benefits exceed the marginal costs.
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we can take steps to ensure that front-line supervisory agencies such as the
SEC and CFTC are better funded and, as a corollary, that their sources of
funding are sufficiently insulated from undue political interference.325 We
can also re-examine how we compensate supervisory personnel with a view
to both attracting and retaining top talent and better aligning their private
incentives with the pursuit of public regulatory objectives.32 6
Lamentably, the trajectory of financial regulation in many jurisdictions
appears to be heading in something of the opposite direction. The CFTC's
budget, for example, has been under almost constant threat from Congres-
sional Republicans since the Dodd-Frank Act expanded the agency's man-
date to include (joint) oversight of OTC derivatives markets.327 Moreover,
while financial sector compensation practices have figured prominently in
the post-crisis debate,328 relatively little time or attention has been paid to
how we compensate the public regulators who oversee this vast, powerful,
and socially important industry.32 9 Given the enormity of the stakes, there
exists a strong case for re-evaluating these (and other) decisions in terms of
their likely impact on both the capacity and incentives of public regulators to
effectively monitor modem financial markets.
Another potential response is to simplify some of the more complex
elements of modem financial markets. David Scharfstein and Adi Sunderam,
for example, have identified a number of potential options for reducing com-
plexity within U.S. residential mortgage and MBS markets."" These options
include: (1) limiting the availability of (or altogether prohibiting) mortgages
with "risky" characteristics such as high loan-to-value ratios, self-financed
down-payment assistance, adjustable rates or negative amortization; (2)
prohibiting the securitization of such risky mortgages; (3) simplifying the
325 Admittedly, this is more of a problem in the U.S. (where regulators such as the SEC
and CFTC rely on Congress for funding) than in the U.K. (where funding is derived princi-
pally from industry levies).
326 Frederick Tung and Todd Henderson, for example, have proposed a compensation
structure for bank supervisors, which, inter alia, links their compensation to the value of eq-
uity and debt in the banks they oversee. See Frederick Tung & Todd Henderson, Pay for Regu-
lator Pertormance I (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id =1986484&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id= 1986484. For a discussion of some of the potential pitfalls of this partic-
ular proposal, see id. at 61-70.
327 See Shahien Nashiripour, Tight Budget Set for US Markets Regulator, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1bc825ae-Ofdd-1lel-a468-00144feabdcO.html#axzz
1rNvZdBNd.
328 For a small sampling of this research, see Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, Regu-
lating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger
Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman
2000-2008, 27 YALE. J. ON REG. 257 (2010); Rtidiger Fahlenbrach & Ren6 Stulz, Bank CEO
Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. EcON. 11 (2011).
329 With the notable exception of Tung and Henderson, supra note 326.
" See David Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, The Economics of Housing Finance Reform:
Privatizing, Regulating and Backstopping and Mortgage Markets, THE BROOKINGS INsr. (Feb.
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/events/2011/0211_mortgage market/021 I
mortgage markets scharfstein sunderam.pdf.
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capital structures that can be used in connection with securitization vehicles;
and (4) prohibiting the re-securitization of junior tranches of MBS into
CDOs.3 1 An analogous set of measures for bilaterally cleared swaps might
conceivably include: (1) restrictions on the types of swaps available to non-
financial end-users332 , (2) mandating higher (and higher quality) collateral,"'
and (3) prohibiting the re-hypothecation of pledged collateral.
Theoretically, regulatory intervention of this kind would serve at least
two purposes.334 First, restrictions on the availability of risky mortgages or
more complex swaps would insulate those with lower tolerances for com-
plexity from the negative consequences of both their own suboptimal deci-
sion-making and the sharp practices of more sophisticated financial
intermediaries. Second, by simplifying the arcane plumbing of these mar-
kets, such measures would reduce information costs for both market partici-
pants (investing in swaps, MBS and CDOs and posting or receiving these
instruments as collateral)3 5 and regulators (attempting to identify, monitor,
and respond to the attendant risks). Ultimately, of course, the welfare impli-
cations of Sharfstein and Sunderam's and other similar proposals are difficult
to evaluate: while they may serve to reduce information (and agency) costs
and promote greater financial stability, one might also expect them to have
an adverse impact on both the ability of counterparties to effectively hedge
risk 3 6 and, more broadly, the flow of credit to the real economy. Indeed, as
we have seen, this welfare indeterminacy is itself an important contributing
factor to the complexity of modem financial markets.
While the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR can be seen as representing (at
the very least) a marginal improvement over the pre-crisis status quo in
terms of responding to the regulatory challenges generated by complexity,
these same regimes effectively disregard the challenges arising from the na-
ture and pace of financial innovation. Indeed, in at least one respect, these
nascent regimes may actually incentivize socially suboptimal over-innova-
tion. Specifically, the newly created regulatory dichotomy between centrally
and bilaterally cleared swaps generates two distinct payoff structures for
market participants. This, in turn, invites financial innovation-or, perhaps
"' See id. at 40-45.
332 Articulating a clear (and yet un-arbitragable) boundary between permitted and prohib-
ited swaps would obviously be an important and difficult task in connection with the imple-
mentation of any such proposal.
. Indeed, regulators in both the U.S. and Europe have signaled their desire to impose
such requirements in connection with the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR,
respectively. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 733, 763, 24 Stat. 1376 (2010); EMIR art. 35.
. In addition to the enhanced financial stability posited by Scharfstein and Sunderam.
See SCHARFSTEIN & SUNDERAM, supra note 330.
Thus potentially ameliorating the adverse selection problem, which triggered the run
on repo. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 321.
3' At least in the case of bilaterally cleared swaps.
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more accurately, "faux customization"3 37-motivated by the desire to avoid
the marginal costs associated with central clearing. Ultimately, there are any
number of reasons why dealers or other counterparties might find it more
advantageous to utilize bilateral instruments (even after accounting for
higher margin and capital requirements). Post-crisis constraints on the sup-
ply of high quality collateral, for example, have increased the opportunity
costs of central clearing relative to the (often under-collateralized"') bilat-
eral market. 9 Along a similar vein, moving standardized instruments on to
CCPs will require dealers to unbundle netted positions involving both stan-
dardized and non-standardized instruments.3 4() In the end, these collateral and
netting benefits may prove very substantial indeed.
The prospect of faux customization is rendered even more acute by vir-
tue of the fact that, at present, OTC derivatives dealers enjoy effective con-
trol over the CCPs which, in the vast majority of cases, will make the initial
determinations in terms of a swap's eligibility for central clearing.341 As Sean
Griffith explains: "major dealers have an incentive to exert governance con-
trol to keep clearing eligible products off of clearinghouses so that they can
continue to trade in the higher margin bilateral market."3 42 Importantly in
this regard, neither the Dodd-Frank Act nor EMIR mandate regulatory re-
view of a CCP's decision that an instrument is ineligible for central clearing.
Compounding matters, one might expect regulators to be reluctant to over-
turn a CCP's eligibility determination out of concern that forcing instruments
on to CCPs could exacerbate systemic risk.343 Indeed, this reluctance might
be reinforced by asymmetries of information and expertise vis-A-vis regula-
tors and CCPs. In this respect, there appears to be ample room for improve-
ment in terms of how the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR address these
information and incentive problems.
One possible way of addressing the problem of faux customization
would be to impose a targeted anti-arbitrage rule (or TAAR) on swap dealers
and other market participants. The primary thrust of a TAAR would be to
mandate that market participants obtain regulatory approval as a pre-condi-
. See Sean Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Toward a Governance Structure ftr De-
rivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L. J. 1153, 1197 (2012).
3 It is at present unclear whether the margin requirements contemplated under either the
Dodd-Frank Act or EMIR would eliminate this arbitrage opportunity.
3 See Manmohan Singh and James Aitken, Deleveraging post Lehman-Evidence from
Reduced Rehypothecation (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 09/42, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wpO942.pdf; Singh, supra note 230, at 3-4;
Tracy Alloway, Financial System Creaks as Loan Lubricant Dries Up, FIN. TiMEs (Nov. 28,
2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/638fc5de-19c1-Ilel-ba5d-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlr
NvZdBNd.
3411 See Singh, supra note 230, at 4, 8.
' Both directly through their equity interests in CCPs and indirectly through their ability
to re-route order flow. See Sean Griffith, Incentive Problems in Derivatives Trading: Towards
a New Governance Structure for Clearinghouses 24-25 (Working Paper, 2010).
342 Id. at 23.
3 See id.
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tion to entering into any "new" or "innovative" species of bilateral swap.344
In order to obtain this approval, the market participant(s) submitting the ap-
plication would need to demonstrate that the innovation responded to a legit-
imate economic need and not simply the desire to avoid central clearing
requirements. To minimize the duplication of effort and expense, the rele-
vant regulatory authority could then issue "blanket" orders authorizing all
other market participants within their jurisdiction to trade in the new
instrument.
A well-designed TAAR would offer two potential benefits. First, it
would alter the anticipated payoffs from regulatory arbitrage: in effect deter-
ring financial innovation not motivated by a legitimate economic rationale.345
Second, it would provide an incentive for risk adverse market participants to
bring new bilateral instruments to the attention of regulators with a view to
obtaining "pre-clearance" for their prospective use. A TAAR would thus
manifest potentially significant informational benefits-bringing new inno-
vations within the perimeter of regulation more rapidly than would other-
wise be the case-while simultaneously reducing the deleterious systemic
effects of regulatory arbitrage. 346
Ultimately, the objective of this paper is not to exhaustively canvas the
ways in which regulators might better respond to the challenges posed by
complexity and financial innovation. Rather, it has been to punctuate the fact
that by simply acknowledging the complexity of modern financial markets
and the nature and pace of financial innovation we can potentially gain a
more complete and nuanced understanding of the problems we face and,
hopefully, how we might go about addressing them. In this respect, this pa-
per should be understood as aspiring to build the foundations for a broader
research agenda examining complexity, innovation and the regulation of
modern financial markets.
CONCLUSION
Complexity and innovation define modern financial markets. Together,
they also generate a host of pressing regulatory challenges. As we have seen,
31 What precisely constituted a "new" or "innovative" swap would of course need to be
fleshed out. Here, however, the definition of innovation introduced supra Part III-focusing as
it does on change as opposed to improvement-would arguably provide a very useful starting
point.
34 The question of how to distinguish between faux customization and economically "le-
gitimate" innovation would of course be of central importance in terms of the operation of a
TAAR. The key for the present purposes, however, is that the burden of proof in this regard
would be on the market participant(s) making the application.
346 Ultimately, of course, further analysis is required to ascertain both the feasibility and
desirability of a TAAR. For a critical analysis of the prospective costs and benefits of a Gen-
eral Anti-Avoidance Rule (or GAAR) in the tax context, see GRAHAM AARONSON QC, A
SIY 10 CONSIDER WHETHER A GENERAL ANI-AVOIDANCE RULE SHOULD BE INTRODUCED
INTO THE U.K. TAX SYSTEM, (The GAAR Study Group 2011), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/tax-avoidancegaar.htm.
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these challenges stem from high information costs, deeply entrenched asym-
metries of information and expertise, and the acute agency cost problems
these asymmetries generate. These challenges underscore the necessity (if
not sufficiency) of mechanisms such as CCPs and SDRs/TRs that subsidize
the production and dissemination of information as a means of promoting
both more efficient private contracting and more effective public oversight.
They also potentially justify more radical regulatory intervention with a view
to reducing complexity within some of the more arcane corners of the global
financial system. Simultaneously, these challenges point to the desirability
of regulation capable of responding to the inherent dynamism of modem
financial markets and, more specifically, the nature and pace of financial
innovation. Here, measures such as a well-designed TAAR for bilateral swap
markets could potentially help reveal valuable information and deter socially
questionable forms of innovation. In the end, while recent regulatory re-
forms under the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR have arguably gone some dis-
tance in addressing these challenges, considerably more work thus remains
to be done before modern financial markets begin to resemble the perfect
markets envisioned by conventional financial theory.
